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INTRODUCTION
The interactions between foreign and domestic tax laws have long been
a preoccupation for both the U.S. government and U.S. taxpayers doing
f Editors' Note: While we have faithfully endeavored to create accurate and
convenient citations for Professor Cui's Article, many of the Chinese sources proved
unwieldy and difficult to verify or translate. We have relied on Professor Cui and have
provided as much information as possible so as to give our readers a sporting chance of
locating a source of interest.
* China University of Political Science and Law. I am grateful to Professors Adam
Chodorow and Kristin Hickman for comments on an earlier version of this Article.
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business abroad.' For example, when the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) considers the grant of income tax treaty benefits to foreign persons
with respect to their U.S.-source income, tax treaties require the IRS to
determine whether the foreign persons are residents of the relevant treaty
partner countries on the basis of the laws of such other countries.2 In the
United States and globally, "international tax arbitrage"-the exploitation
of differences among the tax laws of different countries to reduce or even
eliminate the tax burden on otherwise taxable income-has also become a
central topic in international taxation. 3 Traditionally, this has led the
international community of tax authorities, taxpayers, and tax practitioners
to take serious interest in the substantive tax laws of other jurisdictions.
What is less common, however, is for either government officials or tax
professionals to learn about the broader administrative law framework
within which substantive tax rules are applied in foreign countries. How
tax rules are made in other countries and the process for ensuring their
consistent and accurate application may be viewed alternatively as too
esoteric or as too basic to warrant sustained attention, especially for a
transaction-focused profession.
4
Sometimes, though, foreign administrative law issues are harder to
ignore. This is certainly the case for parties facing formal disputes (or the
possibility thereof) with foreign tax authorities. Beyond specific disputes,
1. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE
OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, VOLUME I: STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM
93-100 (Comm. Print 2001) (outlining the implications of interactions between U.S. tax laws
and foreign tax laws, and between tax treaties and U.S. tax laws).
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
ACCOMPANYING THE U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF Nov. 15, 2006, at 1
(2006), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/
TEMod006.pdf. Being a tax resident of the treaty partner country is a necessary condition
oftreaty benefit eligibility. The United States also requires the determination of whether the
treaty-benefit applicant "derives" U.S.-source income to be determined under the laws of
the applicant's resident country in cases where certain "reverse hybrid entities" are used. See
I.R.C. § 894 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d) (2011). The tax classification of foreign entities
may also involve the analysis of foreign law. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(ii) (2011). Many
other examples may be offered.
3. See generally H. David Rosenbloom, The David R. Tllinghast Lecture: International Tax
Arbitrage and the "International Tax System," 53 TAX L. REV. 137 (2000) (discussing whether the
level of concern over international tax arbitrage is justified); Daniel Shaviro, Money on the
Table?: Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 317 (2002) (considering
advantages and disadvantages of international tax arbitrage); Mitchell A. Kane, Strategy and
Cooperation in National Responses to International Tax Arbitrage, 53 EMORY LJ. 89 (2004)
(emphasizing cooperation between countries to control but not eliminate international tax
arbitrage).
4. But see infra note 9 and accompanying text, and the discussion infra Part V.
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countries may occasionally take actions that broadly disturb the
expectations of foreign investors and treaty partners, actions that must be
interpreted in light of their specific legislative frameworks. The most well-
known example of this is the "treaty override," where "the domestic
legislation of a State overrules provisions of either a single treaty or all
treaties hitherto having had effect in that State." 5 But there are also more
common examples of how foreign countries' administrative law systems
matter. For instance, many countries, including the United States, tax their
residents on their worldwide income and grant credits for any foreign
income tax paid on foreign-source income. 6 However, to protect the
domestic fisc, such countries typically require the foreign tax paid to be
compulsory in nature. Noncompulsory or "voluntary" payments to other
governments cannot be credited. 7 What is a compulsory tax, however, very
much depends on whether the collection of the tax has sufficiently firm
grounds in the law. When the other country's legal system is in disorder,
the question can be difficult to answer. This type of issue has been
highlighted in protracted and intensely contested U.S. litigation in recent
years. 8 It is likely that such disputes will occur with even greater frequency
in the future.9
Indeed, in a significant and growing range of cases, it is no longer
sufficient to ask just what the tax law is in a given foreign country. How tax
law is adopted and enforced in that country has important implications
both for those doing business in the country and for other countries' tax
authorities. This Article examines a particularly interesting class of such
cases, relating to certain international tax rules recently adopted in China.
All of the rules are promulgated by China's State Administration of
5. Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], Tax Treaty Override para. 2 (Oct. 2,
1989) [hereinafter OECD Report on Treaty Override].
6. I.R.C. §§ 901-908.
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5). See generally Alan Fischl & Michael Harper, "hat Exactly
Is a 'Voluntay Tax'?, J. INT'L TAx'N, May 2008, at 32-48 (discussing the increasing pressures
on voluntary tax rules). Germany and Canada are examples of other countries with similar
rules.
8. See Riggs Nat'l Corp. v. Comm'r (Riggs ), 107 T.C. 301 (1996), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1363
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (Riggs I); Riggs Nat'l Corp. v. Comm'r (Riggs lI), 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1023
(2001), rev'd, 295 F.3d 16 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Riggs I); Riggs Nat'l Corp. v. Comm'r (Riggs 1),
87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1276 (2004), affd sub nom. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Comm'r, 503
F.3d 119 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (detailing the interaction between the Brazilian and U.S. tax
systems). These cases are further discussed infia Part V.
9. See Global Reach: US. Bank Gets FTCfor Brazilian Tax by 'Act of State" Doctrine, J. INT'L
TAx'N, Mar. 1999, at 4, 5 (attributing the increasing number of international tax disputes to
globalization).
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Taxation (SAT) 0 and are controversial in that they appear to conflict with
China's obligations under income tax treaties. The application of these
rules has resulted in disputes that directly or indirectly involve U.S.
taxpayers1 and has drawn high-level attention from the IRS.12 The rules
raise urgent questions. Should they be understood as treaty overrides on
China's part? How should residents of treaty partner countries doing
business in China cope with them? And what should the United States do
about them?
This Article will demonstrate that these questions cannot be answered
without an understanding of the Chinese administrative law system. The
following features of the system are particularly relevant. Because China's
legal framework for legislation and agency rulemaking is still a work in
progress, important areas of rulemaking are not yet adequately regulated,
such that the making and interpretation of law tend to devolve to low ranks
in the government's administrative hierarchy. Indeed, devolution is so
systematic in lawmaking that the domestic law procedures for giving proper
legal effect to China's tax treaties are yet incomplete. Nonetheless, this has
not prevented the Chinese government-including all of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches-from affirming that the treaties that it has
entered into are binding on China. Nor has the government, and especially
the judiciary, been prevented from both recognizing the superior effect of
tax treaties over domestic tax law and from insisting that informal agency
rules cannot be binding if they are inconsistent with higher, formal rules of
law. It turns out that all of the controversial Chinese international tax rules
discussed in this Article are informal rules of a very low rank.13 To the
extent that they conflict with China's domestic rules of law and its treaty
10. The State Administration of Taxation (SAT) coordinates with the Chinese Ministry
of Finance (MOF) in implementing tax policy and is therefore in many ways the counterpart
to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The SAT does not itself engage in tax collection,
however, and merely supervises subnational tax agencies in collection and enforcement.
11. For some recent cases see, for example, Jinji Wei, SA TReceives Record Payment From
Indirect Share Transfer, 59 TAx NOTES INT'L 16, 16-17 (2010) (discussing a tax imposed on a
U.S. company-believed to be a Carlyle affiliate-for an indirect transfer of shares in a
Chinese resident company through a wholly owned Hong Kong subsidiary);Jinji Wei, China
Probes Goldman Sachs on Stock Transfers, 59 TAx NOTES INT'L 635, 638-39 (2010) (reporting
SAT's potential $61 million capital gains tax assessment against Goldman Sachs); Dongmei
Qu, China's Capital Gains Taxation of Nonresidents and the Legitimate Use of Tax Treaties, 60 TAX
NOTES INT'L 593, 617-19 (2010) (reviewing the case of a U.S.-owned Barbados company-
believed to be an affiliate of the Texas Pacific Group-denied treaty benefits). See also infra
Part IV.2 (discussing the PanAmSat controversy).
12. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Don't Pay That Tax, Danilack Warns, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Apr. 7, 2011, available at LEXIS 2011 TNT 67-3 (commenting on certain positions taken by
Chinese tax authorities).
13. See infra Part IL.
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obligations, therefore, Chinese courts may not give them legal effect, and
they may also be challenged through administrative appeal.
This has two sets of implications. The first is that the SAT rules in
question are not legally binding under Chinese domestic law where they
conflict with tax treaties and may at best be viewed as "practically
binding."14 However, if a U.S. taxpayer is subject to one of these rules and
deprived of a treaty benefit, but does not attempt to prevent the application
of the rule by seeking administrative or judicial review, it may be difficult
for the taxpayer to argue that it has sought "practical and effective
remedies" against the imposition of the tax-an important standard under
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) for determining whether a tax payment is
noncompulsory and eligible for the foreign tax credit. In effect, the U.S.
foreign tax credit rules impose a cost on U.S. taxpayers who do not
challenge the application of the Chinese rules. In addition to protecting the
U.S. fisc, this part of U.S. tax law also generates a positive externality for
the Chinese legal system. This previously little-discussed type of
unintended consequence of the interaction between U.S. and foreign law
imparts a new meaning to the U.S. regulatory requirement that whether a
foreign levy is a compulsory tax payment be determined "by principles of
U.S. law."'
15
The second set of implications is that because the controversial Chinese
tax rules are invalid under China's domestic law, none constitute a treaty
override. Even so, to respond to these controversial rules, the IRS and the
tax authorities of China's other treaty partners must no longer make the
traditional leap of faith that, somehow, domestic law mechanisms will secure
faithful performance of treaty obligations. They must engage with China's
larger legislative and administrative framework and not just with a few
individuals designated as China's "competent authority." U.S. foreign tax
credit rules already require U.S. taxpayers to do so, and it is time for the
U.S. government to acknowledge a similar need in its pursuit of U.S. tax
policy.
The Article will be organized as follows. Part I will introduce the set of
recent SAT rules are arguably in conflict with China's tax treaty
14. For the concept of practically binding rules, see generally Robert A. Anthony,
Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALEJ. ON REG. 1 (1990)
(examining how various types of agency interpretations of statutes should be reviewed by the
courts); Robert A. Anthony, "Well, You Want the Permit, Don't You?" Agency Efforts to Make
Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 31 (1992) (arguing that
nonlegislative agency rules are not legally binding); Robert A. Anthony, Three Settings in
Which Nonlegislative Rules Should Not Bind, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1313 (2001) (discussing how
practically binding nonlegislative agency rules should not have a binding character).
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(2)(i) (2011).
ADMIISTRATIVE LA wREVIEW
obligations. Part II characterizes the place of the rules within the Chinese
administrative law framework. Part III describes the relation between tax
treaties and China's domestic tax law, particularly how treaties are given
the effect of law under Chinese domestic law. Part IV then reviews
domestic legal mechanisms for challenging tax rules that are inconsistent
with tax treaties, focusing especially on Chinese courts' likely responses.
These sections lead to the conclusion that the problematic SAT rules are
not legally binding. Part V goes on to draw out the implication of this
conclusion for U.S. taxpayers, specifically in terms of what it would mean
for them to have sought "effective and practical remedies" against tax
collection pursuant to the SAT rules. Finally, Part VI examines the
implications of the foregoing analysis for the management of future treaty
relationships with China by the United States and other governments.
Some summary remarks are offered in the Conclusion.
I. RECENT CHINESE TAx RULES IN CONFLICT WITH TAX TREATIES
Treaqy overrides typically refer to situations where national legislatures
intentionally overrule the provisions of tax treaties. 16 In China, cases of
direct conflict between domestic statutes and tax treaties are very rare.
Only one aspect of the current Enterprise Income Tax Law (EIT Law)
17
generates such conflict. Most tax treaties contain nondiscrimination
provisions, which generally prohibit less favorable treatments of the
"permanent establishment" (PE) of an enterprise of a treaty partner country
which carries on the same activities as an enterprise of the country where
the PE is located.' 8 Nonetheless, under the EIT Law, enterprises resident
in China can claim both direct and indirect foreign tax credits for foreign
income tax paid, whereas the Chinese establishments of nonresident
enterprises, while taxed on the worldwide income effectively connected
with such establishments, can claim only direct foreign tax credit. 19 In light
of the fact that the EIT Law expressly states that where the provisions of tax
treaties conflict with its own provisions, the treaty provisions shall prevail,
20
it is quite unclear whether this violation is intentional. And the infraction is
unlikely to be significant in practice.
2'
16. See OECD Report on Treaty Override, supra note 5, paras. 2, 6.
17. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qjye Suo de Shui Fa (
[Enterprise Income Tax Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 16, 2007,
effectiveJan. 1, 2008) (Lawinfochina) (China).
18. See OECD, Articles of the Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital,
art. 24(3), July 17, 2008) [hereinafter OECD Model Convention].
19. Enterprise Income Tax Law arts. 23-24 (China).
20. Id. art. 58; see also infra Part III.
21. Few Chinese establishments of foreign enterprises are likely to own sufficient stakes
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But more so even than in the United States, tax statutes in China form
only the tip of the iceberg of the tax law. Both the EIT Law and the
Individual Income Tax Law22-which together govern Chinese income
taxation and therefore overlap most with the subject of income tax
treaties-are brief. Somewhat more extensive rules are contained in the
implementation regulations issued by the State Council-China's
Cabinet-for these statutes, 23 yet even these State Council regulations
merely lay out the framework for the income taxes and delegate authority
for further rulemaking to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and SAT.
Conflicts with tax treaties in either formal regulations24 adopted by the two
ministries or MOF/SAT policy documents 25 are also extremely rare.
26
It is only when one delves into a more extensive body of rules, scattered
among informal documents issued by the SAT over the years, that one
finds more examples of inconsistencies with tax treaty provisions. A good
place to start is a recent, comprehensive annotation of the China-
Singapore treaty adopted by the SAT in July 2010, and released to the
public in September 2010.27 In issuing these Treaty Annotations, the SAT
in foreign subsidiaries to claim indirect foreign trade credits (FTC) in the first place.
However, "a breach of the treaty occurs when the overriding legislation is passed by the
legislature and not only when it is applied to actual cases." OECD Report on Treaty Override,
supra note 5, para. 7.
22. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Ge Ren Suo de Shui Fa (13 RA *ORt XNW43W)
[Individual Income Tax Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm., Sep. 10, 1980,
effective as last amendedJune 30, 2011) (Lawinfochina) (China).
23. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Ge Ren Suo de Shui Fa Shi Shi Tiao Li (*IPt.,
) [Regulation on the Implementation of the Individual Income
Tax Law] (promulgated by the St. Council, Jan. 28, 1994, effective July 19, 2011)
(Lawinfochina) (China); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suo de Shui Fa Shi Shi Tiao
Li ( #, I , t) [Regulation on the Implementation of the Enterprise
Income Tax Law] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 6, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008)
(Lawinfochina) (China). For a discussion of the status and legal effect of State Council
regulations, see infaa Part III.
24. For the legal status of ministerial regulations, see infia notes 89-91 and
accompanying text.
25. The MOF and SAT, when jointly making tax policy (including in the income tax
area), have adopted an unusual and controversial practice of issuing only informal circulars
instead of formal regulations. For a discussion of this practice, see Wei Cui, What Is the 'Law'
in Chinese Tax Administration?, 19 ASIA PAc. L. R.Ev. 75 (2011). The legal status of these
informal circulars is rather unclear, but because the MOF and SAT are institutionally
endowed with the power of joint tax policymaking, they are likely to be regarded as having
equal effect as formal ministerial regulations issued by the MOF or by the SAT.
26. Regulations in effect before 2008 contained two prima facie instances of breach of
the nondiscrimination article of tax treaties similar to the breach found in the current
Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) Law, and both were repealed by the EIT Law.
27. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zheng Fu He XinJia Po Gong He Guo Zheng Fu
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intends that (1) where the corresponding provisions of other tax treaties
entered into by China are identical to what is contained in the China-
Singapore treaty, the interpretations offered in the Treaty Annotations
would also apply to such other identical provisions; and (2) where there is
any discrepancy between the Treaty Annotations and previous documents
concerning the interpretation and application of tax treaties, the former
shall prevail.2 8 The Treaty Annotations go through each article of the
China-Singapore treaty and are relatively lengthy (though, as discussed
below, they often merely refer to previous SAT documents for further
guidance), and thus have been viewed by many Chinese tax practitioners as
having the status of the official "technical explanations" of all of China's
treaties.2 9 Whether it can have that status, from a legal perspective, is
questionable and will be considered below. 30 What we note first is that the
Treaty Annotations reiterate a number of controversial treaty
interpretations previously published by the SAT, while introducing some
new, problematic interpretations.
Examples of provisions that prima facie conflict with international
understandings of treaty provisions include the following:
1. The expansion of the scope of PEs beyond treaty language. The Treaty
Annotations advance the position that where a foreign enterprise
establishes a fixed place in China solely to provide spare parts to
Chinese clients for equipment sold, the activity is a sufficiently
fundamental and significant part of services provided by the head
office of the enterprise to clients that it would constitute a PE.
3 1
This contradicts the clear language in the PE articles in tax treaties
that "the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display or
delivery of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise" is
Guan Yu Suo de Bi Mian Shuang Chong Zheng Shui He Fang Zhi Tou Lou Shui de Xie
DingJi Yi Ding Shu Tiao Wenjie Shi ( #, fI Rifl N
MAR ROZ 90) [Interpretation of the Articles of the Agreement
Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the
Republic of Singapore for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and the Protocol Thereof] (promulgated by the
St. Admin. of Tax'n, July 26, 2010, effective July 26, 2010) (Lawinfochina) (China)
[hereinafter Interpretation of the Articles of Agreement for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, China-Singapore (China)].
28. Id. Preamble para. 2.
29. See id. Preamble. China does not have a published model treaty, and there is no
other comprehensive explanation of the provisions of the tax treaties that China has entered
into.
30. See infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
31. Interpretation of the Articles of the Agreement for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, China-Singapore (China), supra note 27.
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merely an "activity of a preparatory or auxiliary character" and
therefore does not give rise to a PE.
32
2. A twelve-month look-back rule regarding an ownership requirement for reduced
rates on dividends.33 Some of China's treaties (including the one with
Singapore) offer special reduced withholding tax rates on dividends
declared with respect to shareholders owning at least 25% of the
company. Since 2009, the SAT has required this ownership
requirement to have been satisfied for a continuous period of twelve
months before the dividend is declared. 34 The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) specifically
mentioned this "look back" rule as one that contracting states may
negotiate and incorporate into the text of treaties. 35 China has not
negotiated such a treaty provision and has merely imposed the
requirement unilaterally.
3. The characterization of service fees as royalties in any mixed contract.36 Since
2009, 37 the SAT has held that where any service is performed in
connection with a licensing contract, fees paid for the service, even if
performed outside of China and separately invoiced, are to be
characterized as royalties and thereby taxable in China (whereas
fees for services performed outside of China would not be taxable).
This position was reaffirmed in the Treaty Annotations. It is
inconsistent with the explicit and widely followed recommendations
for the treatment of mixed contracts by the OECD that mixed
contract amounts should be broken down and each component
appropriately taxed. 38
32. It also contradicts the OECD's explicitly stated view that a place for delivery of
spare parts to customers for machinery supplied would constitute a permanent establishment
(PE) only "where, in addition, it maintains or repairs such machinery." OECD Model
Convention, supra note 18, at 103 (commentary on Article 5).
33. Interpretation of the Articles of the Agreement for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, China-Singapore (China), supra note 27.
34. See Zhi Xing Shui Shou Xie Ding Gu Xi Tiao Kuan You Guan Wen Ti (ffl*R-V.
NATPff rol ntn ) [Issues Concerning the Application of the Dividend
Clauses of Tax Agreements] (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Feb. 20, 2009,
effective Feb. 20, 2009) (Lawinfochina) (China).
35. OECD Model Convention, supra note 18, at 190 (commentary on Article 10).
36. Interpretation of the Articles of the Agreement for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, China-Singapore (China), supra note 27.
37. See Execution of the Royalty Clauses of Tax Treaties (promulgated by the St.
Admin. of Tax'n, Sept. 14, 2009, effective Oct. 1, 2009) art. 5 (China); Administering Tax
Treaty Provisions (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n,Jan. 26, 2010, effective Jan. 16,
2010) (China).
38. OECD Model Convention, supra note 18, at 226 (commentary on Article 12); see also id.
at 230-31.
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4. Unusual position with respect to international transportation income. China's
tax treaties generally allocate the right to tax profits from the
operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic to the country
where the operator resides. However, contrary to international
practice and the OECD position on the matter since 1963,
according to which "wet leases" (leases on charter fully equipped,
crewed, and supplied) themselves constitute a form of international
transportation, 39 the Treaty Annotations hold that income from wet
leases is exempt from Chinese taxation only if such leases are
ancillary to some other "main business" of international
transportation. Moreover, for income from activities ancillary to
international transportation to be exempt from Chinese taxation,
such income cannot exceed 10% of the gross income of the shipping
operator, a threshold not contemplated by the China-Singapore tax
treaty or any other of China's tax treaties. 4°
5. Affirmation of the controversial "beneficial ownership" standards in Circular
601.41 The SAT published Circular 601 in 2009, which sets forth
seven factors that count against the claim of a treaty benefit
applicant to be the beneficial owner of certain passive income.
These factors have been widely criticized by international tax
practitioners as going beyond the customary requirements of tax
treaties. 42 Nonetheless, the Treaty Annotations fully endorse
39. Id. at 175 (commentary on Article 8).
40. Interpretation of the Articles of the Agreement for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, China-Singapore (China), supra note 27. For a more detailed discussion, see Wei
Cui, China: A New (Furtive) Approach to Taxing International Transportation Income, in TAX TREATY
CASE LAW AROUND THE GLOBE 159-69 (Michael Lang ed., 2011).
41. Interpretation of the Articles of the Agreement for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, China-Singapore (China), supra note 27, art. 10, § 2(c); id. art. 11, § 2; id. art. 12,
§ 2. "Circular 601 " refers to Ru He LiJie He Que Ding Shui Shou Xie Ding Zhong "Shou
Yi Suo You Ren" ( tM , Nk) [How to Understand and Determine
the "Beneficial Owners" in Tax Agreements] (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Oct.
27, 2009, effective Oct. 27, 2009) (Lawinfochina) (China).
42. See, e.g.,JamesJ. Tobin, Down the BRIC Road, 40 TAX MGM'T INT'LJ. (BNA) 39, 40-
41 (2011) (asserting that most factors listed under Circular 601 are irrelevant to the
determination of beneficial ownership); Peter H. Blessing, Abuse and Anti-Abuse: The Role of a
Tax Professional in a Changing World, in 2 TAX LAW AND CASE REVIEW (W. Xiong ed., 2011)
(noting that the criteria exceed treaty requirements); Houlu Yang, Report on the People's
Republic of China, 95b CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INT'L (IFA) 209, 221 (2010) (highlighting
that the burden of proof rests on taxpayers claiming to be "beneficial owners"). One
example of Circular 601's inconsistency with international understanding is its holding that
"conduit companies" can never be beneficial owners. By contrast, the OECD's position is
that a conduit company will not be respected as the beneficial owner only when through
"the formal owner, it has, as a practical matter, very narrow powers which render it, in
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Circular 60 I's approach.
The above is not an exhaustive list of the aspects of the Treaty
Annotations that may be viewed as inconsistent with common
interpretations of tax treaties. But it should be clear that the items in the
list cover diverse issues and cannot be explained in terms of a single policy
concern, such as international anti-avoidance, or even through a set of
coherent policy concerns other than expanding China's tax base.
43
Moreover, even though China is not an OECD member country, and even
though the OECD Commentaries do not have the status of "legally binding
international instruments," 44 the SAT, in drafting the Treaty Annotations
and elsewhere, tends to borrow very extensively from the OECD
Commentaries in elaborating China's treaty policy, occasionally explicitly
citing these commentaries. 45 International practice as reflected in the
OECD Commentaries thus likely forms an essential background to the
SAT's understanding of treaty provisions (in addition, presumably, to the
understanding of many of China's treaty partners) when it negotiates them.
The deviant SAT interpretations therefore cannot be attributed to a
systematic, alternative set of treaty policies.
SAT documents that conflict with tax treaty provisions are not limited to
those that explicitly pursue treaty interpretation. There are others that do
not ostensibly address the application of tax treaties but, if implemented
without modification, would arguably constitute treaty breaches. A good
example of this latter type is the hugely controversial Circular 698.46 China
taxes capital gains derived from any transfer of the shares of a Chinese
relation to the income concerned, a mere fiduciary or administrator acting on account of the
interested parties." OECD Model Convention, supra note 18, at 188 (commentary on Article
10).
43. For example, items 1, 3, and 4 do not implement any antiavoidance agenda, and
while items 1 and 3 may simplify administration, 4 renders it more complex.
44. OECD Model Convention, supra note 18, at 14. See generally Hugh J. Ault, The Role of the
OECD Commentaries in the Interpretation of Tax Treaties, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 61, 61-68 (Herbert H. Alpert & Kees van Raad eds., 1993).
45. See, e.g., Guan Yu Shui Shou Xie Ding Chang She Ji Gou Que Ding Deng You
Guan Wen Ti ( [Relevant Issues About the Determination
of Permanent Establishments in Tax Agreements] (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n,
Mar. 14, 2006, effective Mar. 14, 2006) (Lawinfochina) (China) (referring explicitly to
OECD Commentaries). See generally Wei Cui, China, in THE IMPACT OF THE OECD AND
THE UN MODEL CONVENTIONS ON BILATERAL TAX TREATIES (Michael Lang ed.,
forthcoming 2012).
46. Jia Qjang Fei Ju Min Q Ye Gu Quan Zhuan Rang Suo de Qi Ye Suo De Shui
Guan Li ( ) [Strengthening the Administration of
Enterprise Income Tax on Non-resident Enterprises' Equity Transfer Income] (promulgated
by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Dec. 10, 2009, effectiveJan. 1, 2008) (Lawinfochina) (China).
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company by a foreign entity.47 As in other countries that attempt to
implement such a regime, Chinese tax authorities must confront the fact
that foreigners may try to avoid the tax, when nontax considerations
permit, by transferring the equity of an offshore parent (direct or indirect)
and not the equity interest in a Chinese company directly. On its face,
Circular 698 attempts to identify such arrangements by requiring the
disclosure of indirect transfers where the holding company transferred is
located in a low-tax jurisdiction. It also provides that offshore holding
companies may be disregarded if their use lacks economic substance.
However, the disclosure requirement has no statutory basis under Chinese
domestic law because the latter does not contemplate jurisdiction over
foreigners who have no Chinese-source income. 48 Moreover, where either
the offshore holding company or the transferor of the shares of the offshore
company is a resident of a treaty partner country, the tax treaty between
China and that treaty partner country would typically preclude Chinese
taxation of the capital gains from the transfer of the shares. 49 Indeed, the
disregard of a holding company in contravention of treaty provisions on
capital gains has been explicitly highlighted by the OECD as a form of
treaty override.
50
II. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF INFORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE
PRONOUNCEMENTS
Overall, the SAT rules set forth in Circular 698, the Treaty Annotations,
47. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qjye Suo de Shui Fa (
[Enterprise Income Tax Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 16, 2007,
effective Jan. 1, 2008) arts. 3-4 (Lawinfochina) (China); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Qiye Suo de Shui Fa Shi Shi Tiao Li ( [Regulation on the
Implementation of the Enterprise Income Tax Law] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec.
6, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 7(3) (Lawinfochina) (China); Zhong Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Qjye Suo de Shui Fa Shi Shi Tiao Li (
[Regulation on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People's
Republic of China] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 6, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008)
art. 91 (1) (Lawinfochina) (China).
48. See Wei Cui, The Unauthorized Decision to Tax Indirect Equity Transfers in China, 2
DIRITTO E PRATICA TRIBUTARIA INTERNAZIONALE 1075, 1077 (2010).
49. This is typically due to the residual clause of the capital gains article of tax treaties,
which precludes taxation of capital gains other than in transactions specifically enumerated
in the article. See, e.g., OECD Model Convention, supra note 18, art. 13(5).
50. OECD Report on Treaty Override, supra note 5, paras. 31-33. Under Chinese domestic
law, because the SAT fails to specify in Circular 698 (or elsewhere) what would constitute
sufficient economic substance to prevent it from disregarding a holding company, while at
the same time shifts the burden of proof to the private party, it is questionable whether the
application of Circular 698 would be sustained in court.
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and the numerous SAT documents cited and reaffirmed in the Treaty
Annotations raise serious questions about China's willingness to adhere to
its treaty obligations. Indeed, the bulk of international tax discussions
about China in the last year has centered on these rules.5 1 What has been
little discussed, however, is the very weak legal effect the documents setting
out these rules possess.
Circulars 601 and 698, as well as a number of other circulars the
positions of which the Treaty Annotations affirm, take the form of so-called
"SAT correspondences" (guoshuihan).52 According to the relevant SAT
internal manual, SAT correspondences may be used for "clarifications and
interpretations of ordinary questions in the implementation of tax policies and
methods of collection." 53 They may also be used for a wide variety of
internal administrative purposes. 54 In the last decade, it was not unusual
for the SAT to issue over 1,200 or 1,300 SAT correspondences a year, most
of which remain unpublished because they have no general relevance for
taxpayers. 55 Because of their miscellaneous administrative uses, the
issuance of SAT correspondences does not require the SAT's ministry-level
51. This is not to say that conflicts between SAT rules and common treaty
interpretation are new. See infra note 130 and accompanying text (citing two SAT
documents from the 1990s).
52. See, e.g., Zhi Xing Shui Shou Xie Ding Gu Xi Tiao Kuan You Guan Wen Ti (IMTR
, ' [Issues Concerning the Application of the Dividend Clauses of Tax
Agreements] (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Feb. 20, 2009, effective Feb. 20,
2009) (Lawinfochina) (China); Zhi Xing Shui Shou Xie Ding Te Xu Quan Shi Yong Fei
Tiao Kuan You Guan Wen Ti ( [Issues Relevant to the
Execution of the Royalty Clauses of Tax Treaties] (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n,
Sept. 14, 2009, effective Oct. 1, 2009) (Lawinfochina) (China); Execution of the Royalty
Clauses of Tax Treaties (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Sept. 14, 2009, effective
Oct. 1, 2009) (China); Administering Tax Treaty Provisions (promulgated by the St. Admin.
of Tax'n, Jan. 26, 2010, effective Jan. 16, 2010) (China); see also Imposition of Tax on Rental
Income Derived by PanAmSat from Leasing Satellite Communication Lines to CCTV
(promulgated by the St. Admin. on Tax'n, Aug. 19, 1999, effective Aug. 19, 1999)
(Lawinfochina) (China).
53. Implementation Measures for the Processing of Official Documents of All Tax
Agencies of China (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Oct. 9, 2004, effective Oct. 9,
2004) art. 29 (China) (emphasis added).
54. These include nonlegal administrative instructions to lower-level agencies, partial
or temporary budgetary adjustments for tax agencies, recommendations or reprimands of
staff members, and correspondence with other government agencies. Id.
55. For instance, for the first six months of 2010, over three hundred SAT
correspondences were issued, of which fewer than sixty are currently publicly available in
the legal database China Law Info. CHINA LAW INFO, http://chinalawinfo.com (last visited
Feb. 12, 2012). Even fewer are available at the SAT's website for the publication of rules.
See ST. ADMIN. OF TAX'N, http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8l36506/n8l36593/
n8137537/n8138502/index.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
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approval and generally is not even deliberated at the level of departments
within the SAT.56 They may be drafted by only one or two SAT staff
members and signed by one senior (department-level) official. Moreover,
because of the SAT's internal organization, it is not unusual for an SAT
correspondence in the international tax area to be issued without review by
the part of the SAT in charge of tax treaties. Most SAT correspondences
are also not reviewed by the Legal Department. It is also not uncommon
for SAT correspondences to be quietly withdrawn. The procedures for
issuing SAT correspondences, in other words, were never designed for
documents that set forth new substantive tax rules of general applicability,
let alone ones that break new grounds in international taxation.
If the use of SAT correspondences were to be analogized to IRS
practice, 57 the small number of staff members involved in producing an
SAT correspondence, their low rank, and the tentative nature of the
positions in such documents all render them similar to IRS private letter
rulings (PLRs), although PLRs are applicable only to particular taxpayers.
Their routine use makes them similar to the miscellaneous array of IRS
internal memoranda. The lack of involvement of the SAT Legal
Department, however, renders them different from any document issued by
the IRS Offices of Chief and Associate Chief Counsels-that is, any
document that is regarded as having the value of legal guidance in the
United States. In any case, the status of SAT correspondences within the
SAT rulemaking system is almost certainly lower than that of revenue
rulings and revenue procedures in the IRS system.
Much of the buzz over "what China is doing" within the international
tax community, therefore, in reality concerns only the views of a few SAT
officials, which have not been elevated to more solid legal form. Much the
same can be said of the only slightly higher-level "SAT issuances"
(guoshuifa), which in past SAT practice were used, in addition to many
internal bureaucratic purposes, 58 to provide "adjustments and supplements
56. The SAT currently has thirteen departments, of which the Bureau of Policies &
Legislation and the International Taxation Department are two. See GuoJia Shui Wu Zong
Ju Zhu Yao Zhi Ze Nei SheJi Gou He Ren Yuan Bian Zhi Gui Ding (
) [Provisions on the Main Functions, Internal Bodies and Staffing of the
State Administration of Taxation] (promulgated by the St. Council, July 10, 2008, effective
July 10, 2008) (Lawinfochina) (China). Within a department there are typically several
sections: for example, the Treaty Section and the Non-Resident Section are two sections
within the International Tax Department.
57. For the use of different types of regulatory documents by the U.S. Treasury and
IRS, see generally Donald L. Korb, The Four R's Revisited- Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and
Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A Viewfiom Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 323 (2008).
58. These include setting out general plans for tax collection, prescribing work
protocols, setting annual agency budgets, issuing special awards or reprimands to staff
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to tax policies and methods of collection, as well as clarifications and
interpretations for important questions in the implementation" of such
policies and methods." 59 The Treaty Annotations took the form of a SAT
issuance, 60 and that is why they are, in an important sense, procedurally
invalid. By the end of 2009, the SAT decided the procedures for issuing
substantive tax rules and interpretations through SAT issuances and
correspondences were so dysfunctional that they had to be completely
revamped. 6 1 In a major new ministerial regulation, the SAT required that
any "tax regulatory document" "prescrib[ing] the rights and obligations of
taxpayers" must be published and compiled in a "SAT bulletin" (gonggao)
format. 62 To qualify as a bulletin, guidance must go through a special set of
procedures. The new regulation took effect on July 1, 2010. The Treaty
Annotations were adopted on July 26, 2010, and released to the public in
September 2010.63 Not only did the Annotations not assume the SAT
bulletin format or satisfy the procedural requirements, but they were also
characterized by other formal oddities. 64 In light of the very recent SAT
regulation, therefore, the Treaty Annotations cannot have the effect of
"prescribing the rights and obligations of taxpayers." 65
members, making other important internal announcements, and so on. Implementation
Measures for the Processing of Official Documents of All Tax Agencies of China
(promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Oct. 9, 2004, effective Oct. 9, 2004) art. 29
(China).
59. Id.
60. See Shui Shou Xie Ding Chang SheJi Gou Ren Ding Deng You Guan Wen Ti (&
k - [Relevant Issues About the Determination of Permanent
Establishments in Tax Agreements] (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Mar. 14,
2006, effective Mar. 14, 2006) (Lawinfochina) (China); Implementation Measures for the
Processing of Official Documents of All Tax Agencies of China (promulgated by the St.
Admin. of Tax'n, Oct. 9, 2004, effective Oct. 9, 2004) art. 29 (China). Like SAT
Correspondences, many SAT Issuances are not published.
61. For a glimpse of the internal discussions that led to this decision, see CHINA
TAXATION PRESS, ANNOTATIONS ON ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR FORMULATING
REGULATORY DOCUMENTS IN TAXATION 4-20 (Li Sanjiang ed. 2010).
62. Shui Shou Gui Fan Xing WenJian Zhi Ding Guan Li Ban Fa (#V&&9i13Z$T
AI') [Administrative Measures for the Formulation of Tax Regulatory Documents]
(promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Feb. 10, 2010, effective July 1, 2010) art. 2
(Lawinfochina) (China).
63. Interpretation of the Articles of Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,
China-Singapore (China), supra note 27.
64. For instance, as widely noted by Chinese tax practitioners, it did not state its own
effective date.
65. In a bulletin, the SAT listed the Treaty Annotations as an effective "regulatory
document," presumably in an attempt to establish its legitimacy in binding taxpayers.
Regarding the Publication of the List of Currently Effective Tax Regulatory Documents
(promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Dec. 13, 2010) (Lawinfochina) (China) However,
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More fundamentally, SAT correspondences, issuances, and even
bulletins all lack the binding effect of law, in accordance with the Law on
Legislation and the Chinese Supreme People's Court's interpretation of the
Administrative Litigation Law. This legal perspective on the formal
character of SAT's policy documents will be elaborated upon in Part IV
below. From an institutional perspective, SAT informal rules are the
products of very devolved rulemaking-it can often be questioned whether
they even represent the view of a department within the SAT, and it is
almost certain that they do not represent the view of the SAT as a ministry,
let alone that of the State Council or the National Legislature. Indeed, this
fact about how the rules are made may explain the pattern of treaty
violations noted earlier--i.e., an array of measures that expand China's
taxing rights without a core policy agenda, adopted against a background
of heavy reliance on international practice and norms to articulate China's
treaty policy.
If agency rules so casually produced as those discussed above could
constitute sources of law in China, one would have to conclude that China,
for all intents and purposes, does not have an administrative law system.
That conclusion is wrong because the premise is wrong. The next two
Parts will offer a more systematic review of the place of tax treaties in the
Chinese legal system, on the one hand, and the SAT rules surveyed above,
on the other. The very clear conclusion is that while tax treaties are both
internationally binding and binding under China's domestic law, the SAT
informal documents, especially where they conflict with tax treaties and
with domestic law, are not legally binding and may be discarded-in theory
and in actual practice-upon administrative or judicial review. This
illustrates how, without taking another country's legislative and
administrative law framework into account, perceptions of what constitutes
tax "law" in another country can be radically misleading.
III. THE PLACE OF TAX TREATIES IN THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM
Understanding devolved lawmaking, it turns out, is crucial for
understanding the place of tax treaties in China's legal system as well. In
design and also (though to a lesser extent) in practice, the conclusion of tax
treaties in China lies far above the sphere of SAT bulletins, issuances, and
correspondences. According to the Chinese Constitution, the State Council
has the power to conclude treaties and agreements with foreign states. 66
it is not clear that one regulatory document can restore legitimacy to another when the latter
is procedurally invalid under the terms of a higher, formal regulation. The weak legal effect
of regulatory documents is discussed further in Part IV, infra.
66. XIANFA art. 89 § 9 (1982) (China).
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But the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC)
exercises the power "to decide on the ratification or abrogation of treaties
and important agreements concluded with foreign states. ' 67 The power to
conclude and the power to ratify or abrogate treaties are enumerated in
parallel with other lawmaking powers of the State Council and the
NPCSC, respectively. Some Chinese scholars have argued that,
consequently, treaties ratified by the NPCSC have the same effect of law as
statutes adopted by that legislative body, whereas treaties merely concluded
by the State Council would have the status of regulations issued by that
executive body.68 For reasons we will now detail, such a view would cast
significant doubt over the legal effectiveness of most of China's (tax and
nontax) treaties.
The Law on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties (LPCT)69
specifies what treaties and agreements require the NPCSC's ratification.
The enumerated categories do not explicitly refer to treaties relating to
taxation, 70 but one category, including treaties and agreements which
contain stipulations that diverge from the (statutory) laws of the People's
Republic of China (PRC),71 potentially implicates tax treaties. 72 Since tax
treaties by their nature limit the taxing power of the contracting states
under domestic law, a literal reading of this provision seems to imply that
all tax treaties, insofar as they modify statutory tax law, require National
67. Id. art. 67 § 14.
68. See, e.g., Yongwei iUu, Important and Unimportant Treaties: A Discussion of the Importance of
Tax Treaties, 26 TRIB. POL. Sci. & L. 171, 171-78 (2008); Zhang Liang, Revisiting the
Application of the WTO Agreement in China, availablefrom www.chinalawinfo.com.
69. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo DiJie Tiaoyue Cheng Xu Fa (
AJI~i ) [Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.,
Dec. 28, 1990, effective Dec. 28, 1990) art. 3 (Lawinfochina) (China).
70. The enumerated categories include: (1) treaties of friendship and cooperation,
treaties of peace, and other treaties of a political nature; (2) treaties and agreements
concerning territory and delimitation of boundary lines; (3) treaties and agreements relating
to judicial assistance and extradition; (4) treaties and agreements which contain stipulations
inconsistent with the laws of the PRC; (5) treaties and agreements which are subject to
ratification as agreed by the contracting parties; and (6) other treaties and agreements
subject to ratification. Id. art. 7.
71. In Chinese, the same termfal is used both for (i) law in the broad sense of rules
having legal effect and (ii) laws and decisions adopted by the National People's Congress
(NPC) or the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC). Where law
in this latter sense is relevant, this Article uses the term statute or (statutoy) law.
72. None of China's tax treaties specifically requires legislative ratification on China's
part. See Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties art. 7 § 5 (China). Category 6, the residual
category, has not received any elaboration as to its meaning, and can be assumed not to
apply to tax treaties. See id. art 7 § 6.
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People's Congress (NPC) ratification. 73 An argument for this reading is that
the executive branch should not be able to modify domestic statutory law
without the agreement of the legislative branch. However, for tax treaties,
the Chinese government has not followed this reading of the requirements
for ratification nor has it offered any public explanation of its reasons for
not doing so. Instead, in the tax area, the executive branch has adopted
procedures in the LPCT that apply to the drafting and negotiation of
treaties where NPC ratification is not required.
Under such procedures, the general rule is for the departments
concerned under the State Council to negotiate and prepare a draft treaty
and then submit it to the State Council "for examination and decision."
74
However, later in the same statute, it states, "with respect to agreements
concerning specific business affairs, with the consent of the State Council,
the draft agreement of the Chinese side shall be examined and decided
upon by the departments concerned under the State Council or in
consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when necessary." 75 In
such latter cases, the concluded treaties merely have to be filed with the
State Council, without the need of the latter's approval.7 6 It is not entirely
clear into which of these two categories-agreements requiring the State
Council's decision, or "agreements concerning specific business affairs"-
tax treaties fall. Some scholars have claimed that tax treaties are concluded
by the MOF or SAT alone, 77 citing as evidence, for example, that the
conclusion of new tax treaties has generally been announced by the SAT,
and rarely by the State Council. 78 Others, however, have stated that the
conclusion of tax treaties themselves is contingent on the State Council's
examination and approval, while other international agreements reached in
the treaty implementation process-such as agreements resulting from
mutual agreement procedures-are handled by the SAT alone.
7 9
73. Some Chinese scholars have argued for such a reading. See, e.g., Xiong Wei, Tax
Treaties and China's Enterprise Income Tax Law, 5 WUHAN U. L. REv. 2, 35 (2009).
74. Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties art. 5 (China).
75. Id.
76. Id. art. 9 (imposing such a filing requirement).
77. See Liu, supra note 68; Liu Yongwei, The Relation Between Sino-Foreign Tax Treaties and
Domestic Tax Law: A Self-Criticism of Relevant Chinese Tax Law Provisions, 6 WUHAN U. L. REv,
63, 63-68 (2006).
78. In terms of signatories, China's tax treaties have been signed by a wide variety of
officials, ranging from premiers and vice premiers, to ministers and vice ministers of the
SAT, the MOF, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), to ambassadors. All of them,
however, could have been acting as authorized representatives of the State Council. See
Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties art. 6 (China) (providing the procedures for such
authorization).
79. Interview with a Staff Member of the Treaty Section of the Int'l Tax Dep't of the
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In any case, the most important from a legal perspective is the State
Council's view that the signing of tax treaties does not require NPCSC
ratification. The legislative branch itself appears to have acquiesced to this
view. As early as 1981, before China had entered into any income tax
treaty, the NPCSC provided in the Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law80
that the rules in any tax treaty between the PRC government and the
governments of other countries should be given superior effect over
domestic law.8 ' Similar provisions could be found in a successor statute, 82
and in the Law on the Administration of Tax Collection (LATC) adopted
in 1992-a statute that applies to the administration of all taxes in China.
8 3
Currently, the superior effect of tax treaties over domestic law is recognized
in the EIT Law.8 4 With the exception of the 1981 law, all of these statutory
provisions were enacted with the knowledge that no tax treaty had gone
through congressional ratification. At the very least, this suggests that the
NPC and NPCSC have consented to the State Council's judgment that,
substantively, tax treaties do not require congressional ratification. It may
even reflect these legislative bodies' belief that, procedurally, nothing has
been amiss in giving tax treaties legal effect under Chinese law.
Statutory acknowledgment that treaties supersede domestic law is by no
means limited to the tax area. Other Chinese statutes have broadly
provided that China's treaties have superior effect over domestic law and
civil litigation matters, except where China has made explicit reservations
to treaty provisions.8 5 Similarly, treaties have superior effect over domestic
SAT, in Beijing (Feb. 2011) (on file with Author).
80. Income Tax Law for Foreign Enterprises (promulgated by the Standing Comm.,
Dec. 13, 1981, effective Jan. 1, 1982), replacedby Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wai Shang
Tou Zi Qiye He Wai Guo Qye (#E,,) [Income Tax
Law for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm., Apr. 9, 1991, effectiveJuly 1, 1991) (Lawinfochina) (China).
81. Income Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises
art. 17 (China).
82. Id. art. 28.
83. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shui Shou Zheng Shou Guan Li Fa(rPtRA*QR
&I'RlRIff IMA) [Law on the Administration of Tax Collection] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sep. 4, 1992, effective as amended May 1, 2001) art. 91
(Lawinfochina) (China).
84. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qjye Suo De Shui Fa (
[Enterprise Income Tax Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 16, 2007,
effectiveJan. 1, 2008) art. 58 (Lawinfochina) (China).
85. Zhonghua Renmin Gonghegno Min Fa ( AlEiM1Ul) [General Principles
of the Civil Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1,
1987) art. 142 (Lawinfochina) (China); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Min Shi Su Song Fa
( [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong.,
Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991) art. 238 (Lawinfochina) (China).
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law concerning administrative litigation procedure (absent explicit
reservations made to the treaties).86 All of these reflect a strong consensus
throughout the legislative and executive branches that China is obligated to
perform under its treaties regardless of the state of domestic law. As
discussed in Part IV, the Chinese judiciary also holds such a view. In all,
then, that treaties are binding irrespective of domestic law (other than the
Constitution) is unambiguously the Chinese government's position.
Nonetheless, there is an obvious tension in this position: if a treaty
concluded by the executive branch-indeed, by a part of the executive
branch exercising delegated authority from the State Council and with
minimal review-can bind China as a country and have superior effect
over Chinese domestic law, then the executive branch can effectively
override the legislative branch in lawmaking. This, under Chinese
domestic law, they supposedly cannot do.
The Law on Legislation (LL),87 adopted in 2000, highlights this tension
without resolving it. The LL plays an important role in delineating both
what rules have the force of law in the Chinese legal system and how
conflicts among different rules are to be resolved. 88 It applies to the
enactment, revision, and nullification of national statutes (by the NPC or
NPCSC), "administrative regulations" (by the State Council),89 local
statutes (by legislatures of provincial and certain other subnational
jurisdictions), and certain regulations issued by ethnic autonomous regions.
It also governs in a similar manner regulations issued by ministries under
the State Council ("ministerial regulations") and by certain local
governments. These, plus the Constitution, are the only forms of law
recognized by the LL, and the creation of such rules constitutes lawmaking
in the broad sense. Among these rules, the following hierarchy (in
descending order of authority) is stipulated: (i) the Constitution; (ii) national
statutes; (iii) State Council regulations; (iv) local statutes (with priority over
local regulations but not ministerial regulations); and (v) ministerial and
local regulations. 90 A rule lower in rank cannot be applied to the extent it
86. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Zheng Su Song Fa (
[Administrative Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 4, 1989,
effective Oct. 1, 1990) art. 72 (Lawinfochina) (China).
87. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa ( [Law on Legislation]
(promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000)
(Lawinfochina) (China).
88. See ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 95-130 (3d ed. 2004).
89. In the following Parts, "administrative regulations" and "State Council regulations"
will be used interchangeably.
90. There are numerous refinements to the hierarchy stated in the text that are not
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conflicts with any rule higher in rank in the hierarchy.
However, the LL makes no mention of treaties and thus gives no
explanation of where they fit within its legal order. If only treaties ratified
by the NPCSC have the status of statutory law, and if treaties concluded by
the State Council or its ministries without ratification possess only the status
of State Council or ministerial regulations, then these latter treaties are
necessarily inferior in effect to statutory law under the LL. Where they
conflict with statutory law, their nonratification would seem to mean they
have not been given the effect of law in China. This paradox plagues many
treaties and agreements that China has signed or acceded to. The gap in
lawmaking procedure has been widely recognized by Chinese scholars of
international law, and proposals to amend the LPCT have been studied in
recent years by the NPC and the State Council.9' However, as things
stand, China's recognition of the binding nature of its treaty obligations is
not always reflected in its domestic law mechanisms, and its commitment to
its treaty obligations often may be said to operate in spite of such
mechanisms.
Some may argue that the acknowledgment of the superior effect of
treaties in specific statutes, such as the EIT Law and the LATC, serves to
remedy the procedural flaw of nonratification of individual treaties.
Moreover, it may be argued that this legislative technique provides
certainty-especially to foreign investors and foreign governments-as to
China's willingness to honor its treaty obligations. How plausible this
argument is may be open to debate92 and, in any case, it does not go far
enough: China's Individual Income Tax Law has never contained a similar
provision regarding the superior effect of treaties. Under this technical
argument, China's tax treaties have never operated to limit domestic law
under the EIT, a position that few would likely accept.
Perhaps a more compelling argument is the following. The specific
statutory statements regarding the superior effect of treaties evidence a
relevant here, as well as rules for resolving conflicts among rules within the same rank in the
hierarchy. See Law on Legislation arts. 78-88 (China); see also CHEN, supra note 88, at 96-97,
112.
91. See REPORT OF THE NPC FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE REGARDING THE
CONCLUSIONS OF REVIEWING DELEGATES' LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE
PRESIDIUM OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE 11TH NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. (Dec. 27, 2008).
92. To start, the EIT Law and Law on the Administration of Tax Collection (LATC),
as statutes on specific legislative matters, cannot override the general procedures for
lawmaking in the Law on Legislation (LL) and the Law on the Procedure of the Conclusion
of Treaties (LPCT). Moreover, it would not be plausible to view such statutory provisions
regarding the superior effect of treaties as delegating authority to the executive branch to
conclude new treaties.
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general recognition that treaties are binding under China's domestic law,93
regardless of the actual procedures for bringing them into force. This
recognition is also shared by the State Council through its acts of
concluding binding international treaties and signing the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and, as will be discussed in Part IV, by
the Chinese courts. In other words, the binding effect of treaties is a
uniform position adopted throughout the Chinese government. Under this
view, tax treaty overrides-in the customary sense of national legislatures
intentionally overruling the provisions of treaties-are impossible in China.
This is literally the case where statutes explicitly concede the superior effect
of treaty law and conceptually the case even where such statutory
provisions are missing.
Given this (what one might call the "orthodox") view, and given the low
rank within the Chinese domestic legal order of the controversial SAT
regulatory documents discussed in Part I, it seems their threat to treaty
partners could easily be contained within the Chinese legal system. In the
next Part, we examine in detail whether this is the case. But an irony worth
underscoring here is that, in a fundamental sense, it is the same system of
devolved rulemaking that is responsible for both the controversial SAT
circulars and the fact that the incorporation of tax treaties into domestic
law is less than robust. In a more developed legal system, the treaties would
be legislatively ratified, and the tax policy would be implemented through
regulations with the binding force of law or at least other rules that receive
careful legal review. However, given where the Chinese administrative law
system stands now, treaties are legally binding even if not ratified by the
NPC, whereas SAT circulars are not legally, but often practically, binding.
IV. MEANS OF CHALLENGING INVALID SAT RULES
Within the Chinese administrative law system, two well-established types
of procedures exist for challenging agency rules that one believes to be
substantively or procedurally invalid; several other approaches are
relatively novel and untried. The two well-established procedures are
administrative appeal and judicial review, either of which may be brought
93. In published annotations that the NPCSC has given to the LATC (available
through www.chinalawinfo.com), for example, the NPCSC, in connection with the LATC
provision acknowledging the superior effect of treaties over itself, does not state that the
intent of the provision was to meet any procedural requirements, but suggests that it merely
reflects the recognition that treaties are binding on the nations that enter them. See
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shui Shou Zheng Shou Guan Li Fa (43*) R*NfII EL0f
191) [Law on the Administration of Tax Collection] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 28, 2001, effective May 1, 2001) art. 91 (Lawinfochina) (China).
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only on the occasion of a specific agency action against a private party and
purportedly based on an agency rule that one disputes. In contrast,
relatively untried procedures offer the possibility of preenforcement review.
A. Administrative Appeal, Litigation, and Pre-Enforcement Review
An administrative appeal94 may be brought under the Administrative
Reconsideration Law95 against a "specific administrative act[ion]. '"96 The
Supreme People's Court (SPC) has interpreted this last concept, which is
also used under the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), as not
encompassing the mere adoption of "administrative rules and regulations,
regulations, or decisions and orders with general binding force," 97 including
"all regulatory documents issued by administrative agencies repeatedly and
generally applicable to more than specific parties."'9 8 However, the
applicant for an administrative review has a statutory right to request that
the reviewing body examine the legal validity of informal agency rules that
purport to be the legal basis of a disputed action. 99 "Informal" agency rules
are essentially those not recognized as having the effect of law under the
Law on Legislation 00 and, in the case of the SAT, would include all SAT
bulletins, issuances, and correspondences. In response to a request for
94. In this Article, "administrative appeal," "administrative review," or "administrative
reconsideration" are used interchangeably and correspond to xingzhengruyi in Chinese.
95. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Zheng Fu Yi Fa )
[Administrative Reconsideration Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 29,
1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) (Lawinfochina) (China); see also Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Xing Zheng Fu Yi Fa Shi Shi Tiao Li ( E, I N 0 ) [Regulation on the
Implementation of the Administrative Reconsideration Law] (promulgated by the St.
Council, May 29, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2007) (Lawinfochina) (China); Shui Wu Xing
Zheng Fu Yi Gui Ze (& ilN1ii) [Rules for Tax Administration Reconsideration]
(promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Feb. 10, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010)
(Lawinfochina) (China) (defining procedures of administrative appeals against all tax
agencies).
96. Administrative Reconsideration Law art. 1 (China).
97. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Zheng Su Song Fa (
[Administrative Litigation Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 4, 1989,
effective Oct. 1, 1990) art. 12(2) (Lawinfochina) (China).
98. In re Fashi, art. 3 (Sup. People's Ct., Mar. 10, 2000) (Interpretations of Certain
Issues in the Implementation of the Administrative Litigation Law); see also In re Fa, Sec. 1(1)
(Sup. People's Ct., June 11, 1991) ((Provisional) Opinions Regarding Certain Issues in the
Implementation of the Administrative Litigation Law) ("specific administrative actions" that
are actionable must be directed at specific persons).
99. Administrative Reconsideration Law art. 7 (China).] Unlike administrative
litigation, which is further discussed below, the validity of formal agency rules, such as
ministerial or local governmental regulations, may not be reviewed. See id.
100. Id.
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review, the reviewing body may revoke or modify any invalid informal rules
or ask a competent government authority to do so. 101 In the case of
informal tax rules adopted by the SAT itself, revocation would be processed
by the SAT's Legal Department; taxpayer challenges through
administrative appeals could thus offer that part of the SAT a chance to
review problematic rules that it may not have had adequate opportunities
to examine before promulgation. 102 According to the SAT, in nearly half of
the administrative appeal cases it processed between 2000 and 2006, the
appellants sought the review of the agency rules underlying the disputed
agency actions; in one-third of these cases, changes were made to the
rules. 1
0 3
Unlike Article I judges in the United States, the reviewing bodies in
Chinese administrative appeal procedures are internal to the executive
branch, and typically comprised of the legal staff in the government agency
that bureaucratically supervises the agency whose action is being
appealed. 104 This institutional arrangement is not unlike those adopted by
numerous countries with established traditions of the rule of law and is, at
least in theory, compatible with the goals of the appeals procedure. Indeed,
according to the SAT's own report, between 1994 and 2005, of all tax
administrative appeals across China, agency actions were equally likely to
be overturned as they were sustained. In the administrative reviews that
the SAT itself processed, 10 5 agency actions were sustained in only 55% of
the cases. For all administrative appeals during the same period, 62% were
terminated through the withdrawal or modification of agency actions or
through mediation.106 The administrative appeal mechanism is thus highly
effective for those taxpayers who decide to use it. 107 What is more, there is
101. Id. art. 26.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 53-61. In the case of informal rules made by
subnational tax agencies, their higher supervising agencies generally have the authority to
demand such changes.
103. Lin Hong, Tax Administrative Cases a Growing Trend, CHINA TAx'N NEWS, Feb. 5,
2007, at 1 [hereinafter Lin, Tax Administration Cases]; Lin Hong, The SAT Uses Administrative
Review to Improve Policy, CHINA TAX'N NEWS, Feb. 5, 2007, at 2.
104. For example, a municipal tax agency may be supervised by both the provincial tax
agency that has jurisdiction over the municipality and by the mayor's office. Its action may
thus be reviewed by a body in either higher agency. See Shui Wu Xing Zheng Fu Yi Gui Ze
(#t- qi lllJ) [Rules for Tax Administrative Reconsideration] (promulgated by the St.
Admin. of Tax'n, Feb. 10, 2000, effective Apr. 1, 2010) arts. 12-20 (Lawinfochina) (China)
(listing choice of venue rules for tax administrative appeals).
105. Many reviews were completed at subnational tax agencies and never reached the
national SAT level.
106. Lin, Tax Administrative Cases, supra note 103.
107. But see infra text accompanying notes 136-37 (discussing the infrequency with which
administrative appeals are generally made).
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no government charge for bringing an administrative appeal,108 nor are
there qualification requirements for any agents or representatives
participating in an appeal proceeding.109
If a taxpayer receives an unfavorable decision in an administrative
appeal, he or she may appeal that decision in a regular court, where
proceedings will be governed by the ALL. The ALL limits the types of
government pronouncements that can be cited as the legal basis for agency
actions 110: whereas national and local statutes, as well as administrative
regulations, are per se a valid basis for such actions, ministerial and local
government regulations are to be taken only "as [a] reference[]" and not as
the legal basis of decisions entered by courts."' 1 Courts are explicitly given
latitude in questioning the validity of regulations issued by ministries and
local governments and in choosing whether to apply such regulations.
Such latitude is even greater with respect to government pronouncements
of lesser status than regulations. The ALL does not itself state that any
effect should be given to these. In an important document issued in 2004
(hereinafter the "Shanghai Meeting Minutes"),11 2 the SPC distinguished
regulations, on the one hand, from "other regulatory documents," on the
other. Although "agencies frequently rely on such.., other regulatory
documents as the basis for specific administrative actions," the SPC stated
they are not "formal sources of law, and do not have the binding force of
legal norms." 113 It is only when a court, in the course of adjudicating cases
relating to specific administrative actions, determines that such regulatory
documents possess "legal validity, effectiveness, reasonableness and
appropriateness," that it may give them effect in determining whether the
specific administrative act has legal basis. "
4
108. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Zheng Fu Yi Fa (XE NLi )
[Administrative Reconsideration Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 29,
1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) art. 39 (Lawinfochina) (China).
109. See id. art. 10 (allowing applicants to select an agent to participate in administrative
reconsideration without imposing requirements upon that agent); Rules for Tax
Administrative Reconsideration art. 31 (China).
110. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Zheng Su Song Fa (
A) [Administrative Litigation Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 4, 1989,
effective Oct. 1, 1990) (Lawinfochina) (China). In this respect, the Administrative Litigation
Law (ALL) was historically an important precursor to the Law on Legislation in curbing the
executive branch's ability to make law and is also what, one might say, gives the Law on
Legislation its bite.
111. Id. arts. 52-53.
112. Meeting Minutes Regarding the Application of Legal Norms in Reviewing
Administrative Cases, sec. 1, para. 3 (Sup. People's Ct., May 18, 2004).
113. Id. sec. 1.
114. Id. Courts may also comment on the "legal validity, effectiveness, reasonableness
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As with many other civil law systems, Chinese courts generally have no
power to invalidate regulations and other rules of general application."l 5 In
such systems, the courts' supposed role is not to make or even interpret the
law but simply to apply the law to the facts. The nullification of invalid
rules and regulations is left to the legislative and executive branch entities
that make them. Procedures have long existed for seeking the nonjudicial,
pre-enforcement review of statutes and formal regulations recognized as
law under the LL," l6 but they have not been used often, in part because
many government agencies tend to promulgate their rules in an informal
format, which takes these rules outside the ambit of the LL. i17 To address
this problem, a number of recent statutes and regulations have attempted to
create formal procedures for reviewing informal rules. For example, the
Law on the Supervision of the Standing Committees of People's Congresses
at Various Levels' I8 enables congressional bodies to revoke invalid rules
issued by the executive branch, including informal "regulatory documents."
Since 2005, the SAT has allowed taxpayers to apply for pre-enforcement
review, conducted by higher bodies in the administrative hierarchy, of
informal rules issued by subnational tax agencies, 19 and since 2010 the
SAT has provided for such review of its own informal rules. 1
20
It is likely, however, that these procedures will remain relatively
and appropriateness" of regulatory documents in their written decisions. Id.
115. Administrative Litigation Law art. 12 (China).
116. See Law on Legislation art. 90 (China) (allowing various political organizations to
submit regulations that may contradict laws to the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress for examination); Xing Zheng Fa Gui Zhi Ding Cheng Xu Tiao Li (filA
N 1 t ) [Ordinance Concerning the Procedures for the Formulation of
Administrative Regulations] (promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 16, 2001, effective Jan.
1, 2002) art. 35 (Lawinfochina) (China).
117. For examples illustrating this obstacle to the pursuit of pre-enforcement review, see
Cui, supra note 25, pt. II.B.
118. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Geji Renmin Dai Biao Da Hui Chang Wu Wei
Yuan Hui Jian Du Fa ( , -t tlfl,) [Supervision of
Standing Committees of People's Congresses at Various Levels (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007) arts. 29-30
(Lawinfochina) (China).
119. Shui Shou Gui Fan Xin WenJian Zhi Ding Guan Li Ban Fa (Shi Xing) (LNIt±
# 5# %l 3MA A (i t)) [Administrative Measures for the Formulation of Regulatory
Documents on Taxation (for Trial Implementation) (promulgated by the St. Admin. of
Tax'n, Dec. 16, 2005, effective Mar. 1, 2006, repealedJuly 1, 2010) art. 33 (Lawinfochina)
(China).
120. Shui Shou Gui Fan Xing WenJian Zhi Ding Guan Li Ban Fa (
31,1) [Administrative Measures for the Formulation of Tax Regulatory Documents]
(promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Feb. 10, 2010, effective July 1, 2010) art. 35
(Lawinfochina) (China).
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infrequently used: details of the procedures are rarely spelled out, and very
often the reviewing bodies are under no obligation to respond but act only
at their discretion. 121 From an institutional perspective, the reviewing
bodies often may also lack the clout to revoke the questionable rules.
Litigation, therefore, emerges (not surprisingly) as the basic option for
taxpayers who wish to prevent the application of agency rules that they
believe are invalid. The ALL and the SPC's Shanghai Meeting Minutes
unambiguously grant the power to courts to discard informal agency rules
where they conflict with higher law. Court fees for administrative litigation
are also negligible. 122 However, most foreigners are likely to take the
utmost caution in deciding to sue any government agency in their host
country. A more careful assessment of the real likelihood of favorable
outcomes in a lawsuit is necessary.
B. The Likelihood of Prevailing Against Government Agencies
As a first step in such an assessment, any casual assumption that the
Chinese judicial system lacks independence is rebutted by the following
statistic provided by the SAT: between 1994 and 2005, the government
won in only 55% of the judicial proceedings against tax agencies. 123 It is
difficult to gather representative samples of judicial decisions to
independently assess that statistic because Chinese courts and legal
professionals do not yet systematically publish and classify judicial
decisions. 124 Nonetheless, the SAT itself should have no incentive to
exaggerate the frequency of government losses. Moreover, available cases
suggest that the Chinese judiciary is by no means unprepared to handle
disputes about tax treaty claims.
One clear conclusion from published cases is that, since the 1990s, courts
have steadily adhered to the position, later articulated in the SPC's 2004
Shanghai Meeting Minutes, that informal agency documents are not
121. Id. (requiring only that authorities "shall" handle review in a timely manner). This
is also the case with the congressional review prescribed by the Law on the Exercise of
Supervision by the Standing Committees of People's Congresses at Various Levels. See supra
note 118.
122. The basic fee is between 50 and 100 yuan. Su Song Fei YongJiao Na Ban Fa (igii
) [Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs] (promulgated by the St.
Council, Dec. 19, 2006, effective Apr. 1, 2007), art. 13(5) (Lawinfochina) (China).
123. Lin, Tax Administrative Cases, supra note 103.
124. In a sample of civil tax litigation comprising roughly 200 published cases gathered
by the Author, the percentage of taxpayer wins was lower (around 30%), which may,
however, reflect a publication bias by the courts. The sample was created from legal
databases including www.chinalawinfo.com and others, which gather court cases through
paper and online publications by the courts.
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binding on their decisions. Instead, informal agency rules are given effect
only when they are consistent with higher laws and regulations and deemed
reasonable and appropriate. The rejection of informal agency rules as
legally binding can be blunt. In one tax case, the court admitted into
evidence an SAT Correspondence that recommended a specific tax
treatment for the plaintiff, but it gave no consideration or weight to the
document in its final decision. 125 In other tax cases, the courts expressly
treated informal rules as nonbinding and revoked agency actions based on
them. 126 Perhaps most relevant for litigation involving tax treaty claims are
a well-known pair of cases, discussed below, in which the courts treated
SAT interpretations of tax treaties (made through one SAT Issuance and
one SAT correspondence) as nonbinding, and instead pursued treaty
interpretation de novo. 127 These stances are also entirely in line with
judicial decisions in nontax areas.
While administrative litigation brought by foreigners is relatively rare,
and as a result treaty-based litigation is also rare, Chinese courts are also
known to give treaty law superior effect over Chinese domestic law.128 The
most widely discussed instance of this in the tax area is a 2001 lawsuit
brought by the U.S. satellite company PanAmSat claiming a refund of
taxes paid on income received for satellite transmission services rendered to
China's official television station, China Central Television (CCTV). The
tax bureaus claimed that the income constituted rental income (for the use
of satellite equipment) under Chinese domestic law and royalty income
under Article 11 of the U.S.-China tax treaty. 129 The court of first instance
disregarded two SAT informal documents that had set out these claims
130
125. See Shenzhen Energy Grp. Ltd. v. Inspection Bureau of the Qnzhou Local Tax
Bureau, Guixingzhongzi, at 30 (Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Higher People's Ct.
2002) (China).
126. See, e.g., Shenzhen Jinmanke Electric, Ltd. v. Shenzhen State Tax Bureau
Xingchuzi, at 003 (Shenzhen Interm. People's Ct. Nov. 21, 1997) (China).
127. PanAmSat Int'l Sys., Inc. v. Second Dep't in the External Substation of the Beijing
State Tax Bureau (PanAmSat I]), Gaoxingzhongzi, at 24 (Higher People's Ct. Beijing, Dec.
20, 2002) (China); PanAmSat Int'l Sys., Inc. v. Second Dep't in the External Substation of
the Beijing State Tax Bureau (PanAmSat 1) Yizhongxingchuzi, at 168 (First Interm. People's
Ct. Beijing, Dec. 20, 2001) (China).
128. For a summary discussion, see Zuo Haicong, A Study of the Issue of Directly Applying
Treaties, Iegal Studies, 3 CHINESEJ.L. 97, 97-100 (2008).
129. Specifically, the claim was that it constituted royalty income received as "a
consideration for the use of, or the right to use.., industrial, commercial or scientific
equipment." PanAmSat II, Gaoxingzhongzi at 24; see also Tax Agreement with the People's
Republic of China, U.S.-China, art. XI, 3, Apr. 30, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-30.
130. Imposition of Tax on Foreign Enterprises' Incomes from Leasing Satellite
Communication Lines (promulgated by the St. Admin. of Tax'n, Nov. 12, 1998, effective
Nov. 12, 1998) (Lawinfochina) (China); Imposition of Tax on Rental Income Derived by
[64:1
2012] FOREIGNADMIWISTRA TVE IA WAND IVTERA TIONA L TAXA 77ON 219
and directly applied both a domestic tax statute and the U.S.-China tax
treaty. The appeals court found a conflict between the domestic statute
and the U.S.-China tax treaty, and then invoked the provision in the
domestic statute 13 1 giving superior effect to the treaty to deliver a verdict on
the basis of treaty provisions. In both cases, the courts' treaty
interpretations were erroneous in ways that might not have been obvious at
the time. 132 As a result of these erroneous interpretations, PanAmSat lost
the lawsuit. However, the courts made no mistake about what law is
relevant: informal agency rules have no legal effect, and treaty provisions
are to be given priority over domestic law.
All of Chinese law-statutes, regulations, and judicial opinions both
generally and in specific cases-thus points to the following unambiguous
conclusions: informal agency documents of the types discussed in Part I are
not legally binding, they will not be given effect by courts if they are found
to conflict with higher law, and tax treaties are a form of law that is
regarded as having the highest legal effect. Why, then, do most taxpayers
who are subject to the controversial SAT rules appear to treat these rules as
binding?
This question is currently being debated among advisors on Chinese
taxation, and while some answers have been proposed, none is at the same
time plausible and sympathetic. One assertion-understandably almost
never made in writing, and often offered only on occasions that are felt not
to be too "sensitive"-is that China lacks an effective legal system for
resolving disputes with government agencies. However, those who make
this assertion do not explain how or to what extent the system is ineffective
such that those asked to pay taxes that are not legally required should be
absolved of any responsibility for formally seeking remedies. In the context
of the deprivation of tax treaty benefits, depicting foreign investors (some of
which are among the most powerful companies in the world) as helpless
victims of a dysfunctional legal system seems unpersuasive, to say the least.
Another explanation is that, even with controversial treaty interpretations,
the tax burden borne by foreign investors is sufficiently low that confronting
PanAmSat from Leasing Satelite Communication Lines to CCTV (promulgated by the St.
Admin. on Tax'n, Aug. 19, 1999, effective Aug. 19, 1999) (Lawinfochina) (China).
131. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Wai Shang Tou Zi Qye He Wai Guo Qiye ("Ak
AAR JIkP-R4*A) [Income Tax Law for Enterprises with Foreign
Investment and Foreign Enterprises] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 9,
1991, effectiveJuly 1, 1991, annulledJan. 1, 2008) art. 28 (Lawinfochina) (China).
132. If made today, the courts' interpretations would clearly contradict the OECD
commentary on the issue. See OECD Model Convention, supra note 18, at 223-24 (commentary
on Article 12) (clarifying that income from satellite transmissions does not fall under the
category of royalty income in tax treaties).
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Chinese tax agencies is unnecessary from a business perspective. 133 This is
of course quite plausible in some cases but, for U.S. taxpayers and their
affiliates at least, it would certainly bar the latter from claiming U.S. foreign
tax credit for the erroneously paid Chinese tax, if the facts are adequately
disclosed to the IRS.
134
The explanation for the ability of informal SAT rules contradicting
Chinese domestic law and tax treaties to bind taxpayers that perhaps
possesses the greatest combination of plausibility and exculpatory effect is
that anyone pursuing a challenge would be "sticking one's head out."'
135
Some data sheds light on the plausibility of this explanation. In 2006, there
were a total of 91,667 cases of administrative appeals against agency actions
throughout China and 52,792 cases of administrative litigation. 136 In more
recent years, these numbers declined noticeably. 137 It can be estimated that
each year between 1,000 and 1,200 cases of administrative appeals and
fewer than 500 lawsuits are launched against tax agencies across China.
These numbers-both for the total amount of administrative and judicial
appeals and for tax disputes-are generally regarded as low, given China's
geographical and population size and its decentralized administrative
structure. There is indeed a widely shared view among practitioners and
scholars of Chinese law that the pursuit of formal administrative remedies is
still a relatively uncommon, even if not rare, choice.
What factors cause this state of affairs is hotly debated. For example, the
claim that the Chinese judiciary lacks independence has been challenged by
scholars, especially with respect to areas that are not politically sensitive.
138
133. See, e.g., Jack Grocott, Foreign Taxpayer Takes Dispute Through Chinese Courts, INT'L TAX
REv., Dec. 13, 2011, available at http://Nvww.intemationaltaxreview.com/Article/
2731834/Foreign-taxpayer-takes-dispute-through-Chinese-courts.htm ("While China has
drastically increased its collections on non-resident taxpayers, the magnitude of such efforts
is potentially still not great enough to force the hand of [multinational corporations] in terms
of seeking greater litigation and administrative review."). The tax rate applicable to passive
income (i.e., dividends, royalties, interests, and capital gains) received by foreigners without
an establishment in China is 10% before any reduction by applicable treaties. Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Qjye Suo De Shui Fa Shi Shi Tiao Li (
M) [Implementation Rules of Enterprise Income Tax Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l
People's Cong., Dec. 6, 2007, effectiveJan. 1, 2008) art. 91 (Lawinfochina) (China).
134. See infra Part V.
135. If others do not pursue formal remedies, there are not only psychological but also
real, practical disadvantages to resorting to such remedies. For example, it may not be easy
to find competent lawyers who can handle administrative litigation if there is weak market
demand for such services.
136. See Part IV: Statistics, LAw Y.B. CHINA, at 613 tbls. 2, 3 & 6 (2006).
137. By 2008 administrative appeal cases declined by 6.7% and administrative litigation
cases by 16.9%. See id. at 634-36 tbls. 1-5.
138. For an up-to-date review of the state of judicial independence in China, see
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Some Chinese tax scholars have advanced very different hypotheses. For
example, some suggest that the aggregate tax rates of different taxes are so
high that many Chinese taxpayers engage (or hope to engage) in
negotiations with tax authorities to bring the amounts of their tax liabilities
below legally-required levels. Maintaining a nonconfrontational
relationship with tax agencies is believed to be necessary for preserving that
option. 39 But this type of explanation has little relevance for major foreign
investors in China, who do not negotiate with Chinese tax agencies on a
routine basis.
However the current state of relative disuse of the Chinese system of
public law remedies is explained, it tends to impart a practically binding
effect to informal agency rules. Even rules that appear patently invalid still
need to be taken very seriously. This does not mean, though, that they can
be taken as given and remain unchallenged. In the next section, we show
that for U.S. taxpayers doing business in China abandoning treaty benefits
and Chinese legal remedies have costs at home, ones which they and their
U.S. tax advisors have historically tried to avoid.
V. EFFECTIVE AND PRACTICAL REMEDIES: U.S. TAXPAYER OPTIONS
Under U.S. federal income tax law, a creditable foreign tax must be a
payment that is compulsory and pursuant to the authority of a foreign
country to levy taxes. 140 A payment in excess of the amount of foreign tax
liability determined under foreign law is not a compulsory payment.'
41
Specifically, under U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury) regulations,
"[a]n amount paid does not exceed the amount of such liability if the
amount paid is determined by the taxpayer in a manner that is consistent
with a reasonable interpretation and application of the substantive and
procedural provisions of foreign law (including applicable tax treaties).'
42
Moreover, the taxpayer should exhaust "all effective and practical
remedies, including invocation of competent authority procedures available
under applicable tax treaties, to reduce.., the taxpayer's liability for
generally JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR GLOBAL RULE OF LAv
PROMOTION (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2010), and Randall Peerenboom, Judicial
Independence in China: Common Myths and Unfounded Assumptions (Sept. 1, 2008)
(unpublished research paper, LaTrobe University), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1283179.
139. See Shi Zhengwen, High Nominal Tax Burdens: Shackles on the Scientific Development of
Chinese Tax Affairs, in TAXATION RESEARCH (forthcoming).
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(1)-(2)(i)(2010).




These basic requirements raise the following questions for U.S. taxpayers
facing the application to their own and their affiliates' transactions' 44 of the
problematic Chinese tax rules discussed in Part I. Could the payment of
tax according to such rules be regarded as "consistent with a reasonable
interpretation and application of the substantive and procedural
provisions" of Chinese law, including applicable tax treaties? Although the
relevant substantive issues may be more fully explored than they are in this
Article, the answer suggested by the analysis in Parts I and IV is "No."
This is because the informal SAT rules, to the extent they conflict with
treaty law, 145 are substantively invalid and cannot have the effect of law in
China. The question then arises as to what might constitute, for U.S.
taxpayers, "effective and practical remedies" against the payment of taxes
pursuant to such rules, exhaustion of which entities such taxpayers to U.S.
credits for any such tax paid. Could a U.S. taxpayer simply make the
following claim, perhaps relying on their Chinese tax advisors: "Practically
nobody sues the government in China, and the least likely to do so are
foreigners, so for all intents and purposes these rules are binding"?
The difficulty of supporting such a claim under U.S. tax law is
considerable, and not only because of the facts about the frequency of tax
litigation in China (infrequent, but not negligible), the likelihood of
prevailing in any litigation (in fact quite high), and the past cases of
litigation by foreign taxpayers discussed in the last Part. Just as important,
the difficulty is on account of the consistent and high standards for
compulsory tax payments, as established under U.S. law and as maintained
by IRS practice. These standards are well summarized in the following
statements in the Treasury regulations:
Whether a foreign levy requires a compulsory payment pursuant to a foreign
country's authority to levy taxes is determined by principles of U.S. law and
not by principles of law of the foreign country. Therefore, the assertion by a
143. Id.; see also Fischl & Harper, supra note 7, at 33-34 ("IRS policy is that a foreign tax
credit should be denied unless the taxpayer has taken reasonable measures to mitigate its
foreign tax liability. The foreign tax credit is designed to reduce the possibility of double
taxation when a taxpayer is subject to income tax in the U.S. and a foreign country, not to
permit a taxpayer to be indifferent to its potential foreign income tax liability so long as the
foreign tax can be offset against its U.S. tax liability.").
144. The requirements with respect to compulsory taxes under Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2
also apply in the context of indirect foreign tax credits provided under I.R.C. § 902 and "in
lieu of' credits under § 903. Treas. Reg. § 1.902-IT(a)(7) (2009); Treas. Reg. § 1.903-1(a)
(2011). In the following, reference to payments by U.S. taxpayers includes payments by
their affiliates for which the U.S. taxpayers may claim indirect foreign tax credit.
145. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (noting that some of the rules, such as
Circular 698, may also be invalid under Chinese domestic law).
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foreign country that a levy is pursuant to the foreign country's authority to
levy taxes is not determinative that, under U.S. principles, it is pursuant
thereto. 
146
More specifically, the Treasury regulations require a cost-benefit
analysis of whether a remedy is "effective and practical"; only if the cost of
seeking remedy (including the risk of offsetting or additional tax liability) "is
reasonable in light of the amount at issue and the likelihood of success" is it
required to be sought. While necessarily factually based, this analysis is also
framed by certain legal and policy boundaries. Going to the heart of the
matter, some U.S. tax practitioners have questioned whether taxpayers are
"limited to considering the costs of litigation and potential counterclaims
and offsets."' 147 What about the desire to maintain and not to jeopardize
the taxpayer's business relationship with the foreign sovereign, the loss of
which could "lead to a significantly greater loss of business revenue than the
foreign taxes at issue? ' 148 "May the taxpayer make additional foreign tax
payments to stave off an 'audit from hell'... [even] if the taxpayer has little
or no foreign tax exposure as a strict legal matter?"' 149 What about the
desire to avoid negative publicity that one fears might ensue if one enters
into a formal dispute with a part of the host country's government?
While these questions underscore difficult choices that taxpayers
sometimes have to make, they do not expose ambiguities in the cost-benefit
analysis described in the regulations. Cutting deals with foreign
governments is certainly not what was contemplated in' the cost-benefit
analysis.150 This is not just because a foreign levy is "not a tax, to the extent
a person subject to the levy receives . . . directly or indirectly, a specific
economic benefit... from the foreign country in exchange."' 15  More
fundamentally, the "effective and practical remedies" test is clearly
intended to balance the interest of taxpayers and the U.S. government's
desire to protect revenue. It follows that preserving business relationships
that are conditioned upon not exercising one's entitlement to the protection
of law, avoiding a confrontational audit, or simply eschewing the risk of
negative publicity are objectives insufficient to outweigh the U.S.
government's legitimate claim to revenue.
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(2)(i) (2011).
147. Fischl & Harper, supra note 7, at 42.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 40 nn. 37-38.
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(2)(i). A "specific economic benefit" is one "that is not
made available on substantially the same terms to substantially all persons who are subject to
the income tax that is generally imposed by the foreign country." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.901-2(a)(2)(ii)(B).
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Examples in the regulations, judicial decisions, and IRS guidance all
help illustrate how the effective and practical remedies test has been
applied. One example in the Treasury regulations 152 suggests that (i)
commencing an administrative proceeding in the foreign country and
requesting for competent authority (CA) assistance are both expected
(where the costs of doing so are not unreasonable), and (ii) the cost
consideration is applied similarly to foreign judicial proceedings and
requests for the IRS's CA assistance.153 In the recently decided Proctor &
Gamble case,' 54 a U.S. company's failure to assess whether it was possible to
obtain Japanese tax relief led a district court to affirm the IRS's decision to
deny U.S. foreign tax credits for certain Japanese taxes paid. Both the
IRS's litigating positions in this and other cases 155 and published IRS
guidance demonstrate that the agency has taken very seriously the
compulsory tax requirement. Indeed, because the IRS makes the
determination of whether a payment is compulsory on a case-by-case
basis,' 56 this has very much been an area of IRS-made policy. 15 7 For
example, although the regulations provide that taxpayers "may generally
rely on advice obtained in good faith from competent foreign tax advisors
to whom the taxpayer has disclosed the relevant facts" in interpreting
foreign tax law, 158 the IRS does not view the advice of foreign counsel as
sufficient to satisfy the taxpayer's burden of proof that it has exhausted all
effective and practical remedies. 159
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(ii) (Example 3).
153. That is, the regulation does not contemplate taking into account "special business
factors" in weighing the cost of foreign proceedings.
154. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 2010-2 T.C.M. (CCH) 85,593 (S.D. Ohio
2010).
155. In an earlier case involving another major U.S. company, the taxpayer was advised
by an Italian tax expert that its only argument against the application of an Italian tax rule
was "a near certain loser." Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 661, 669
(1997). The taxpayer nonetheless filed for a refund and initiated the process of litigating its
claim in an Italian court. Id. It was in such circumstances that the court held that the
taxpayer had exhausted effective and practical remedies, and it was unnecessary to wait until
the litigation's unsuccessful conclusion before the taxpayer can claim foreign tax credits. Id.
at 675; see also infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Riggs cases).
156. See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory (Mar. 5, 1998), 1998 WL 1984349 (explaining that
even if reasonable, "amounts are not compulsory unless petitioner exhausted all of its
effective and practical remedies to reduce its foreign tax liability").
157. For a discussion of successive reformulations of the compulsory tax requirement in
the Treasury regulations, see Fischl & Harper, supra note 7, at 34-37.
158. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(i) (2011).
159. See I.R.S. Non Docketed Serv. Advice Review (Sept. 2, 1988), 1988 WL 1092574
("We do not think that advice of foreign counsel will satisfy the taxpayer's burden of proof in
this regard."). Moreover, this nondocketed service advice review states, "As to
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Probably the most striking illustration of the IRS's approach to the
compulsory tax payment issue can be found in the Riggs litigation. 160 In the
Riggs controversy, the IRS forcefully questioned the legal validity and
binding effect, under Brazilian domestic law, of a private ruling prepared
by the Brazilian IRS and adopted by the Brazilian Ministry of Finance.161
The IRS argued that the ruling was no more than an advisory opinion and
had no binding effect under Brazilian law. Further, it argued the Brazilian
Ministry of Finance's "order" to withhold tax based on the ruling was also
not compulsory and would be overturned if challenged in a Brazilian court.
Finally, consistent with its suspicion of irregularities in the way the ruling
had been issued, the IRS questioned the sufficiency of the evidence
produced by the taxpayer that tax had indeed been paid to the Brazilian
government. Notably, the U.S. Tax Court agreed with these IRS findings
in two successive decisions. 1
62
The IRS's perseverance in enforcing the compulsory tax requirement
throughout the last few decades has compelled "U.S. tax experts to make
administrative remedies, we think that the taxpayer and/or its foreign sub must take
advantage of all administrative remedies that, under the facts, could reasonably be expected
to achieve a reduction in the foreign tax liability if the foreign tax authorii is at all inclined to
reduce such liability." Id. (emphasis added).
160. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Although the Riggs controversy focused on
whether certain tax payments were required under foreign law and not on the issue of
"effective and practical remedies," it nonetheless illustrates the type of "principles of U.S.
law" that the IRS intends to apply.
161. Riggs Nat'l Corp. v. Comm'r (Riggs I), 163 F.3d 1363, 1366-67 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
162. Riggs Nat'l Corp. v. Comm'r (Riggs1), 107 T.C. 301 (1996), rev'd, 163 F.3d 1363
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (Riggs l); Riggs Nat'l Corp. v. Comm'r (Riggs Il), 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1023
(2001), rev'd, 295 F.3d 16 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Riggs I'. These decisions were both overturned
by the D.C. Circuit, first on the ground that the "act of state doctrine" should have
precluded the Tax Court from inquiring into the legality of the Brazilian Ministry of
Finance's private ruling and of the order for tax collection with respect to the U.S. lenders,
Riggs II, 163 F.3d at 1368-69, and second on the ground that the tax receipts furnished by
the borrower (the Brazilian Central Bank) were entitled to the "presumption of regularity"
accorded to foreign government entities. Rggs IV, 295 F.3d at 20-21. The IRS indicated in
a 1999 Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum that it disagreed with the first decision.
Memorandum from Cynthia J. Matson, Assistant Chief Counsel (Int'l) (May 21, 1999),
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/9931035.pdf. As a result of these reversals, the Tax Court
delivered a decision to reduce, instead of deny, Riggs Bank's FTC claim. Riggs Nat'l Corp. v.
Comm'r (RiggsP/), 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1276, 1287 (2004). It is unlikely for the "act of state
doctrine" to prevent U.S. judicial review of whether foreign governments have pursued tax
collection in violation of tax treaties, since a U.S. court can look to a treaty or other
"unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles" to review the legality of
foreign government actions. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428
(1964); see also Am. Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D.D.C. 1980) (explaining
that the act of state doctrine does not apply where a treaty establishes applicable rule of law).
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cost/benefit-type determinations regarding issues based on foreign law
about which they do not have expertise."' 163 To a significant extent, IRS
policy in this area has been internalized by U.S. taxpayers. Prima facie, it
seems difficult to justify the adoption of different policies simply because in
some countries formally disputing one's tax liabilities is uncommon. Part
IV, above, has shown that the monetary costs of administrative appeal and
litigation in China are very low and would not in themselves justify
acquiescence in the denial of treaty benefits based on invalid treaty
interpretations. The chances for taxpayers to prevail in administrative and
judicial proceedings, including by requesting the revocation or
nonapplication of erroneous agency rules, are also by no means "remote."
Like any other legal system, the main mechanisms for resolving
disagreements between Chinese government agencies and private parties
depend on judicial review. The Chinese administrative law system is
designed to resolve such disputes and its chief inadequacy at the present lies
not in the verdicts the system delivers but in its state of relative disuse.
U.S. tax law thus likely requires U.S. taxpayers to consider pursuing, and
probably to take actions to pursue, administrative or judicial remedies
against the application of the controversial SAT rules discussed in Part I.
Many U.S. taxpayers concerned may flinch at this conclusion164: is this not
too merciless an application of the compulsory tax requirement? Does it
make for good tax policy? We examine this last question in the next Part,
which further demonstrates the relevance of foreign administrative law to
making international tax policy.
VI. STRENGTHENING TAx TREATIES
BY SUPPORTING THE RULE OF LAW
The legal principle underlying the conclusion reached at the end of the
last section is set forth in the Treasury regulations: "Whether a foreign levy
requires a compulsory payment pursuant to a foreign country's authority to
levy taxes is determined by principles of U.S. law and not by principles of
law of the foreign country."' 165 That is, U.S. legal principles govern the
163. Fischl & Harper, supra note 7, at 42. For example, during the Marks & Spencer
litigation between 2005 and 2006, "many U.S. tax experts concluded that U.K. subsidiaries
of U.S. taxpayers must file protective claims for refunds or else risk a voluntary tax
challenge" in fight of predictions that the European Court ofJustice was going to overrule
certain positions held by the U.K. tax authority. Id. at 41. This was done even though
"U.K. Inland Revenue refused to process claims for refund based on a Marks & Spencer-type
theory at the time." Id.
164. One can imagine a cry of disbelief: "What? We are being asked by the SAT to pay
Chinese tax, and by the IRS to sue the SAT to prevent the collection of such tax?"
165. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(2)(i) (2011).
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overall interpretation of the compulsory tax concept, even though specific
aspects of the concept (e.g., whether a payment "is consistent with a
reasonable interpretation and application of the substantive and procedural
provisions of foreign law"'166) may be determined under foreign law. The
concrete meaning of this approach has not been discussed much among
U.S. tax practitioners, 67 but it takes on an unexpected significance in the
type of cases discussed in this Article. By virtue of being part of the U.S.
legal system, U.S. tax law assumes that tax authorities are constrained by
the law just as taxpayers are, and that taxpayers are protected by and will
exercise their legal rights. It simply does not envision U.S. taxpayers either
compromising their legal rights in unprincipled fashions or taking
advantage of legal loopholes. 168 Thus, acquiescence in legally invalid but
"practically binding" rules not only does not fit into the specific regulatory
cost-benefit test for the exhaustion of all effective and practical remedies, it
arguably has no place in the larger foreign tax credit framework or even
U.S. tax law in general. Rather, principles of U.S. law require tax to be
collected according to rules that are legally valid and orders that are legally
binding. Where this is not the case, the first remedies these principles look
to are also legal mechanisms.
This rather fundamental feature of U.S. tax law is "exported" to other
countries when potential foreign tax credit denial generates sufficient
incentives for U.S. taxpayers to pursue administrative and judicial remedies
in other countries. And in countries where the rule of law is weak, this
"export" may constitute a positive externality. This is very likely the case in
China. From the Chinese government's point of view, the amount of tax
revenue at stake under the controversial SAT rules discussed in Part I is
small and will likely remain so in the foreseeable future. 69 By contrast,
166. Id. § 1.901-2(e)(5).
167. Some guidance exists, and occasionally it is to the taxpayer's advantage. For
example, in Schering Corp. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 579 (1978), acq. inpart 1981-82 C.B. 2, the
U.S. Tax Court sustained the FTC claims of a taxpayer that had not brought its issue to the
competent authority, deeming such administrative steps to be "futile" and citing U.S. case
law. Id. at 602. The IRS acquiesced in the Schering decision only in result. See I.R.S. Non
Docketed Serv. Advice Review 8261 (Sept. 2, 1988), 1988 WL 1092574. However, it is
presumably the requirement to apply U.S. legal principles that justifies the IRS position, set
out in that same document, that the opinions of foreign counsel would not be conclusive as
to whether effective and practical remedies have been exhausted.
168. The IRS's position in Riggs 1, 107 T.C. 301 (1996) and Riggs II, 163 F.3d 1363
(D.C. Cir. 1999) illustrates this point.
169. In 2009, total income tax revenue collected from foreign entities constituted less
than 4% of total EIT revenue collected in China, which itself was less than 20% of total tax
revenue (Author's computation based on data released by the SAT's International Tax
Department and reported in Refining Management and Improving the Level of Service in Taxation of
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although individual officials or even certain departments in tax agencies
may feel vexed by appeals and detest litigation, the Chinese government
overall, not to mention legal professionals and citizens in general, is
supportive of such formal challenges to agency actions. This is first because
the rule of law (especially in politically nonsensitive areas) is currently one of
the main strategies that the government relies on to improve the
accountability and therefore legitimacy of the Chinese party-state. 170 It is
further because the use of existing mechanisms for challenging agency
rulings and actions is still low, and it is widely believed that the greater use
of such mechanisms could help reduce arbitrary exercises of official
discretion and opportunities for rent-seeking. It would also reduce the
power of legally nonbinding rules to bind practically, by making formal
dispute resolution a more normal part of everyday tax compliance. For
example, by creating a market demand, it may encourage the mastery of
administrative procedure by tax professionals while lowering the current
market premium paid to service providers whose specialty is arranging
private meetings and negotiations with tax officials.
Thus, even from the Chinese government's own perspective, the attitude
toward more extensive use of administrative appeals and litigation is better
than neutral. From a social perspective, it is definitely positive. China also
has a foreign tax credit system that in many respects resembles the U.S.
system. Foreign taxes erroneously paid (e.g., in excess of what is required
under tax treaties) cannot be credited.' 7' In enforcing the compulsory tax
Non-Residents, CHINA TAx'N NEWS, Oct. 19, 2009, at 1, and on the Report of the Ministry of
Finance on the Implementation of the 2009 Central and Local Budgetaiy Plans, (Mar. 5, 2010),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-03/16/content- 13181369.htm). The
predominant portion of such revenue collected from foreigners was likely based on
uncontroversial tax rules. The portion of tax collection pursuant to controversial rules
allocable to U.S. taxpayers and affiliates should be negligible from a revenue perspective.
170. See, e.g., Key Points in Implementing the Comprehensive Promotion of
Administration in Accordance with the Rule of Law (promulgated by the St. Council, Mar.
22, 2004, effective Mar. 22, 2004) (a national initiative for all executive branch agencies to
improve the rule of law; paragraph thirty emphasizes administrative appeals procedures in
particular); Guowuyuan Guan YuJia Qiang Fa Zhi Zheng Fujian She de Yijian (R*fAT
Qi&A ffV*,JkX) [Opinions of the State Council on Strengthening the Building of a
Government Ruled by Law] (promulgated by the St. Council, Oct. 10, 2010, effective Oct.
10, 2010) (Lawinfochina) (China) (setting forth a recent renewal of the 2004 initiative;
paragraph twenty-four emphasizes administrative appeals procedures and paragraph
twenty-five emphasizes judicial independence in administrative litigation).
171. QiyeJing Wai Suo de Shui Shou Di Mian ( Llk ft,&.9E) [Issues Concerning
the Foreign Income Tax Credit of Enterprises] (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance and
the St. Admin. on Tax'n, Dec. 25, 2009, effective Jan. 1, 2008) para. 4 (Lawinfochina)
(China). Other provisions similar to U.S. rules include the exclusion of penalties, fines and
interests, payments rebated or in exchange for direct or indirect subsidies. Id.; see also
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requirements set forth in the Treasury regulations with respect to payments
that are inconsistent with treaties, therefore, the IRS would simply be
acting in a fair, reciprocal fashion.
The foregoing considerations suggest that the denial of foreign tax
credits to U.S. taxpayers who do not contest the application of the
controversial SAT rules discussed in Part I not only is supported by law, but
may be justified as a matter of policy: it is a rule that is socially optimal
when the state of Chinese administrative law is taken into account. U.S.
tax law may thus help to shape the legal and governance environments in
foreign countries, much as the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act 172 and similar
legislation do. However, once we move to the policy perspective, it is no
longer sufficient just to ask whether the IRS is justified in imposing the
foregoing constraints on U.S. taxpayers' actions. Clearly, the question
should also be raised: what should the U.S. government do directly, as a
treaty partner with China?
It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine these questions broadly
in light of U.S. treaty policy. Instead, the following identifies two sets of
insights on these questions that the review of Chinese tax administrative law
in this Article offers.
The first set of insights has been anticipated in Part III. The challenges
to foreign investors' expectations arising from the controversial SAT rules
discussed in this Article should not be conceived of as treaty overrides on
China's part. Instead, at least under current Chinese law, treaty overrides
are not possible. 173 No Chinese government agency or official has argued
that some national interests of overwhelming importance have arisen so
that there is no other choice but to abandon China's treaty obligations.1
74
Nor has anyone asserted that China can no longer perform under the
relevant aspects of China's tax treaties due to some complications under
domestic law. 175 Indeed, given the manner in which the SAT has
continued to negotiate new tax treaties for China--which has not reflected
any of the substantial deviations in treaty interpretation contained in the
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo QOye Suo de Shui Fa Shi Shi Tiao Li (€X El[N R
V M ) [Regulation on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income Tax Law]
(promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 6, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 77 (Lawinfochina)
(China) (limiting FTC to taxes paid in accordance with "foreign law and relevant rules").
There is no mitigating provision under current Chinese FT C rules that is analogous to the
"effective and practical remedies" test: foreign taxes paid in excess of treaty requirements
cannot be credited, period.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)-(g) (2006).
173. See generally supra Part III.
174. See OECD Report on Treaty Override, supra note 5, para. 17.
175. See id. para. 10.
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controversial SAT circulars-there may not even have been any change in
China's treaty policy, in terms of mutual expectations that China aims to
achieve an agreement on during treaty negotiation. Instead of turning its
back on its treaty obligations, what has happened may be more properly
characterized as a neglect of its treaty obligations.
In a way, this is good news: tax treaties are notoriously fragile. There
are few easy remedies once a country decides to breach them. As the
OECD Treaty Override Report observes, in the event of one country's
genuine decision to override treaties, its treaty partners essentially have only
three options: protest, 176 terminate or suspend the operation of the treaties
in whole or in part (where a violation is material),177 or renegotiate the
treaties. 178 Protests may often be ineffective. Termination "could do even
more harm economically and endanger the possibility of finding an
acceptable solution in the future, [while partial] suspension.. . would only
leave things as they are." 179 Renegotiation is not only time-consuming, but
must also take into account the fact that the breaching party had already
decided not to engage in treaty renegotiation before implementing its new
position. In comparison, a reminder to a country that has strayed from its
treaty obligations should be easier.
However, addressing the controversial SAT circulars also requires more
than the traditional methods for resolving disagreements about treaty
interpretation or application (e.g., engagement in communication with
China's competent authority through mutual agreement procedures). 180
This brings us to the second set of insights. As this Article has shown, both
the adoption of tax treaties and their implementation and interpretation are
handled in China through a rather devolved administrative process. This is
a process that currently lacks sufficient legislative, judicial, and even
executive oversight. 181 By virtue of a strong consensus among these
176. Id.para.21.
177. Id. para. 22.
178. Id. para. 33.
179. Id. para. 30. At the time of the report, "Member countries have so far refrained
from taking retaliatory measures (which all agree would not be conducive to better
understanding in the international tax field) against overriding legislation." Id. para. 34.
180. OECD Model Convention, supra note 18, art. 25(3) (providing that the "competent
authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavor to resolve by mutual agreement any
difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of the Convention. They
may also consult together for the elimination of double taxation in cases not provided for in
the Convention"). The U.S.-China Tax Treaty contains an identical provision in Article
24(3).
181. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of legislative
oversight); supra Part IV.2 (regarding the rareness of treaty-based litigation); supra notes 57-
62 and accompanying text (regarding the suspected lack of executive oversight).
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different branches of government, this fact has not prevented tax treaties
from being given, conceptually, proper legal effect within China's legal
system. However, this conceptual consensus is in itself insufficient to
guarantee tax treaties' faithful implementation. If China's treaty partners
merely pursued dialogues with a few SAT officials, they would not be
tapping any mechanism that could reliably resolve difficulties encountered
in treaty application. This is because, as well-intentioned and technically
competent as some of these officials might be, their work is not yet pursued
within a properly disciplined administrative state, nor, most crucially,
within an environment characterized by the rule of law. In such
circumstances, it would be quite difficult for them to ensure China's treaty
obligations are properly taken into account in agency rulemaking, or that
other individuals in the government do not take upon themselves to pursue
what they regard as China's national interests.
By contrast, when foreign taxpayers pursue administrative or judicial
appeals in China-with or without the negative incentives imposed by their
home countries--to uphold what they believe are their rights under tax
treaties, they precisely tap mechanisms of executive or judicial oversight.
Similarly, the governments of China's treaty partners should consider using
such mechanisms (and mechanisms of legislative oversight), especially if
they expect their own taxpayers to do so. That is, they should not simply
act on the traditional habit of the treaty specialist and make the leap of faith
that somehow, whatever the other county's domestic law, treaty obligations will be
honored. 182 Instead, they should try to engage the mechanisms that would
ultimately improve treaty implementation.
This may mean, for a start, attempting to make a wider group of officials
within the Chinese executive branch (whether they be in the SAT, MOF,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the State Council) aware of the specific
implications of treaty provisions. And it ultimately may mean engagement
with China's legislative and judicial branches. While none of these
possibilities are as well established as competent authority procedures, one
should remember that neither are mechanisms for executive and judicial
oversight that U.S. taxpayers may be asked to resort to. Just as the
unfamiliarity of these latter mechanisms may induce U.S. investors to treat
the controversial SAT circulars as practically binding and to neglect the
pursuit of all effective and practical remedies, the habit of merely
interacting with a few SAT officials on treaty matters will do little to
encourage proper treaty implementation in China. Continuing such a
habit would mean that the leap of faith of the treaty specialist would remain
just that-an unjustified leap of faith.
182. See, e.g., OECD Report on Treaty Override, supra note 5, para. 10.
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CONCLUSION
For every country that has signed tax treaties and given them effect
under domestic law, the country's commitment to tax treaties is stronger
than the commitment of any individual tax official charged with treaty
implementation (including those officials designated as the treaty competent
authority of the country). The former commitment is the ultimate cure for
treaty violations. And what connects the country's commitment, on the
one hand, and the commitment of individual officials, departments and
agencies, on the other, is the country's system of public law governing
legislation, agency rulemaking, and agency adjudication. It is in this
fundamental sense that the rule of law forms the backbone of the
implementation of tax treaties (and indeed of all international treaties).
Chinese tax rules that deviate from treaty obligations are interesting
because, at least in principle, China has taken a clear stance that tax treaty
obligations must be honored regardless of domestic law. 183 Without an
understanding of how tax rules are made and enforced in China, therefore,
the adoption of rules at odds with China's treaty obligations would seem
inconsistent at best. Digging beneath the surface of the laws to develop a
robust appreciation of the Chinese tax system allows one not only to
understand this seeming contradiction but also to appreciate a surprising
set of implications for China's treaty partners and their taxpayers.
Aside from tax treaties, many countries may also engage in international
coordination to alleviate double taxation, for example through the
collective, though legally unilateral and internationally nonbinding,
adoption of rules such as the granting of foreign tax credits. Some of them
do so while assuming implicitly that such coordination will be achieved
within some framework of the rule of law: as we have seen in this Article,
this is true of the U.S. tax law as reflected in the compulsory tax
requirement under the foreign tax credit rules. This is another reason why
administrative law considerations lie close to the core of international
taxation.
Although this Article focused extensively on Chinese examples, the type
of cases it examines could arise between any two tax treaty partners. In
every country, foreign investors may face the unpalatable decision of
whether to comply with rules that are not legally binding, e.g., rules that
have no formal legal basis and are procedurally or substantively invalid.
183. This stance may be contrasted with that of the United States, where treaties may be
overridden by later-enacted federal statutes. The U.S. government's tax treaty overrides are
a familiar topic in U.S. international taxation. See, e.g., Richard E. Andersen, Analysis of
United States Income Tax Treaties, 1.03[1] Legal Status of U.S. Income Tax Treaties, n.96
(Thomson/RIA 2011).
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Although domestic taxpayers confront similar decisions, the decisions may
be distinctively more difficult for foreign persons because their expectations
may have been shaped by publicly available information about the
country's legal system (including information about their rights under
international treaties). Practically but not legally binding rules are more
likely to be inconsistent with such expectations, and following rules that are
known to be legally invalid may gradually lead one away from processes
and interactions governed by law. Sometimes, confronting such choices
may challenge some of the fundamental assumptions that one had made
when deciding to do business in a foreign country. What this Article has
shown is that these serious predicaments may not be matters of indifference
to the foreign investors' home country governments. How these
governments should react is a question that pushes considerations of foreign
administrative law to the foreground.
